University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1994

Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts
after Daubert
Joseph Sanders

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sanders, Joseph, "Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert" (1994). Minnesota Law Review. 1708.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1708

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and
Mass Torts After Daubert
Joseph Sanders*
The death of Frye v. United States,1 is no longer greatly exaggerated. 2 Frye finally met its federal court demise in 1993.3
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,4 the Supreme
Court did what commentators 5 had long recommended and declared that the "Frye test" did not survive the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 The Frye test had declared inadmis* Professor of Law, University of Houston. Work on this paper was supported by the University of Houston, Environmental Liability Law Program. I
wish to thank Roger Park for encouraging me to write this article and the editors at the Minnesota Law Review for their careful editing. Special thanks are
due to Linda Gordon Hestor who contributed significantly to the quality of the
finished product. Space limitations precluded our plans for a longer, jointlyauthored article.
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Commentators have announced Frye's death on numerous occasions.
See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEmiNsTE'S EvIDmNCE
702(3), at 702-36 (1993); 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAm, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 86-91 (1978). Others have argued that Frye did survive the Federal Rules. See 1 DAvID W. LOuISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 818 (1977).
3. Frye's continued vitality in state courts remains unclear. In an early
state case considering the issue, the Arizona Supreme Court sidestepped the
question by stating "we are not bound by the United States Supreme Coures
non-constitutional construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence when we construe the Arizona Rules of Evidence." State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz.
1993) (en banc). For a valuable summary of state and federal law with respect
to Frye's status, see Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years
Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 357, 372-90 (1989).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. See Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1245-50
(1980); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REv. 879 (1982).
6. In so holding, the Supreme Court stated:
The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid "general
acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of
the Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.".. . Given the Rules' permissive
backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that
does not mention "general acceptance," the assertion that the Rules
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sible novel expert testimony that was not "generally accepted"
as reliable in the relevant scientific community. 7 Commentators
criticized Frye both for its unidimensional approach 8 and for being too malleable to be useful.9 In Daubert,the Supreme Court
held that Federal Rule 702 superseded Frye and rejected the approach followed by a majority of courts.1 ° Not only does Daubert
mark the end of a long controversy over Frye's viability after the
Federal Rules, 1' it also marks the end of debate on Frye's merits
somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general acceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony.
That austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
7. The D.C. Circuit reasoned as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Over the next fifty years, many jurisdictions adopted the
Frye rule. See EDWARD CLEARY,McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 606 (3d ed. 1984).
8. See Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 559-64 (1984).
9. The "general acceptance" test can be strictly applied to exclude all but
widely accepted, mainstream scientific principles and techniques. See, e.g.,
United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Other courts have applied the test very liberally,
however, prompting some observers to conclude that these judges often do little
more than rely upon the opinion of a few experts. Gianelli, supra note 5, at
1209-11. As Gianelli notes, identifying the appropriate field within which general acceptance must be achieved can be problematic because almost all scientific techniques have received general acceptance in some narrowly defined
field. Id. at 1211 n.95. In addition, it is not always clear what facets of the
proffered testimony or underlying methodology must be "generally accepted."
See Steven J. Grossman & Christopher K. Gagne, Science and Scientific Evidence II, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1053, 1055-57 (1993); see also United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing expert testimony concerning compulsive gambling disorders), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
10. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993); see PAUL C. GLANELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIc EVIDENCE § 1-5, at 8-13 (1993); see also U.S. v.
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming the continued use of the
Frye text).
11. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-the Effect of "PlainMeaning" Jurisprudence, the
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 876-85 (1992);

Margeret A. Berger, A Relevant Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26
JuRrsmxcs J. 245, 246 (1986); Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FoRDHAm L. REVIEW 595, 625-58 (1988); Ronald L. Carlson, Policing
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testimony.
The timing of Frye's rejection is of greater interest than the
event itself. The Federal Rules of Evidence have been in place
for nearly 20 years and, for most of that period, the circuits have
disagreed about whether the Rules incorporated Frye. Yet only
now has the Supreme Court taken the time to resolve the issue.
One important reason for the Court's recent interest is a new
sense of urgency concerning the increasing use of scientific expert testimony and the role judges should play in monitoring
and controlling such testimony. The emerging belief that an increase in "junk science" in the courtroom 13 requires greater judicial vigilance in admitting expert opinion has fueled this sense
of urgency. 14 For example, the Judicial Conference Advisory
the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577, 582 n.17 (1986);
Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A ProposedAmendment to FederalRule
702, 26 Juxmmics J. 260, 263-64 (1986); Hanson, supra note 3, at 357; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1988); Frederick B. Lacey,
Scientific Evidence, 24 Juux
cs J. 254, 266 (1984); Frederic I. Lederer,
Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26 Juramimcs J. 240,
240 (1986); Moenssens, supra note 8, at 545; James E. Storrs, Frye v. U.S. Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule 702, 26
JuRAETmcs J. 249, 250-52 (1986). The Rules' failure to clarify the standard for
admitting novel scientific evidence, once called "the greatest single oversight in
the Rules," precipitated this extensive literature. Becker & Orenstein, supra,
at 877.
12. See David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The
Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LrniG. 117 (1990);
John D. Borders, Fit to be Fryed: Frye v. United States and the Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 Ky. L.J. 849 (1989); Gianelli, supra note 5; Frederick A. Bechtold, Note, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence? DNA PrintIdentification, 19 STETSON L. REV. 245 (1989); Dirk Eshleman, Note, Different
Standardsand Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Frye Test for Admitting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectrographic
Evidence Introduction, 5 REV. LIG. 327 (1986).
13. PETER HUBER, GALmIEo's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 6
(1991) [hereinafter HUBER, GALmEo's REVENGE]; PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 43-44 (1988); Peter Huber, Junk
Science in the Courtroom,26 VAL. U. LAw REV. 723 (1992); see KUNZWEIL ET. AL,
THE ENvIRONMENTAL EXPERT AFTER RUBANICK AND CHRISTOPHERSEN: BEWARE

THE JABBERWOCO! 1 (1991); Jeffrey K Sherwood, In Re Paoli Railroad: The
Third CircuitPunts to the "Coffincorner,"ToxIcs L. REP., Nov. 14, 1990, at 773,
781 (criticizing the Third Circuit's approach giving plaintiffs' experts leeway in
valuing non-tangible injuries).
14. See Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.
1986); Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983); E. Donald
Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 489-93 (1989); Barry M. Epstein &
Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product LiabilityAc-
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Committee on Civil Rules, intending to curtail the use of expert
testimony, recently proposed a change to Federal Rule 702 that
reliable
would allow expert testimony only if it is "reasonably
15
and will substantially assist the factfinder."
These developments were not lost on the Supreme Court.
After dispensing with the Frye rule, the Court outlined the trial
judge's gate keeping role. 16 The Court's discussion raises two
primary questions addressed in this Article: what approach
should courts employ in assessing the admissibility of expert scientific opinion and, given this approach, how restrictive should
courts be in allowing expert opinion into evidence?
Part H reviews Daubert's approach to admissibility. This
Article argues that the concept of scientific validity lies at the
heart of the Court's approach to admissibility. By taking this
SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 656-59 (1987); Michael S. McCarthy, Note,
"Helpful"or "ReasonablyReliable?:" Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350
(1992); see also John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985) (noting that judges select and commission expert witnesses in German trials); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986) (observing that the Federal Rules
allow parties to use expert testimony "to obfuscate what would otherwise be a
simple case"). But see Peter Bell, Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: A Bad
Idea Whose Time Has Come, PRODUCT SAFETY & LLABLrrY REP., Jan. 17, 1992,

tions, 17

at 79.

15. The proposed rule would read, in relevant part:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if
(1) the information is reasonably reliable and will substantially assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to provide such testimony.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 83
(1991) (emphasis omitted). With respect to these changes, the committee noted:
[T]he revision requires that expert testimony be "reasonably reliable"
and "substantially assist" the fact-finder. The rule does not mandate a
return to the strictures of Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d [sic] 1013
(D.C. Cir., 1923) (requiring general acceptance of the scientific premises on which the testimony is based). However, the court is called
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any significant support and acceptance within the scientific community or
that otherwise would be only marginally helpful to the fact-finder.
Id. at 84. For a critique of the proposed change, see Jack B. Weinstein, Rule
702 of the FederalRules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138
F.R.D. 631 (1991). The Judicial Conference Committee has deferred action and
referred the issue to the new Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. SuMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
FEDERAL

PROCEDURE 11-12 (1992).

16. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-98.
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approach, the Court has invited judges to dispense with surrogate measures of scientific validity and to investigate the issue
directly.1 7 Even though scientific validity is central to the
Court's approach, the Court failed to sufficiently develop the
concept in its opinion. Part III argues that this deficiency principally stems from the Court's failure to recognize that scientific
validity has multiple meanings and is always a matter of degree.
This Part illustrates this deficiency by sketching out four different threats to the validity of scientific research.
Although the Daubert Court devoted significant attention to
how courts should approach the admissibility of scientific evidence, it largely failed to define how restrictive courts should
be. i 8 The Court failed to offer any realistic examples to clarify
what it means to call an expert's methodology, data, or reasoning invalid.' 9 Rather, the Court offered little more than the general observation that courts should judge the admissibility of
scientific evidence on the basis of scientific principles of reliability and validity. In this regard, Daubert suffers from an ailment
frequently attributed to Frye: it provides little guidance on how
to apply Rule 703 in actual cases. The wide variation in the way
the courts have applied Rules 702 and 703 in the past does little
to clarify the issue. 20 Despite the Supreme Court's silence, how17. See Bert Black et. al, Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: The
Supreme Court Launches a New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 Tax. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 29-30, on file with author).
18. The Daubert Court did reject the argument that relevancy alone should
govern the admissibility of scientific evidence. 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
19. The Court's unenlightening example concluded that a purported relationship between the existence of a full moon and the probability that an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally would not satisfy its
scientific validity standard. Id. at 2796.
20. See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 133-35; Eshleman, supra note 12, at
328-31. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a very passive
stance in Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984). The plaintiff claimed that exposure to paraquat, a herbicide, caused his lung disease. Id. at 1532. Two of the plaintiffs treating physicians proffered expert testimony on the causality issue. Id. at 1533. They
based their opinion that paraquat exposure caused the plaintiff's disease on
clinical observations of the plaintiff and the fact that one expert had identified
other "similar" cases. Id. The court did not examine the scientific validity of
this testimony, allowing the experts to testify and affirming a jury verdict for
the plaintiff, noting that: "On questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such
testimony." Id. at 1534-39. The Ferebee court's description of the evidence as a
"classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide the victor,"
has been cited frequently. Id. at 1535. For a discussion of the Ferebee opinion,
see Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and StatisticalLinks: The Role of Sci-
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ever, the degree to which a court may aggressively act to keep an
expert's proffered testimony from the jury presents the critical
21
issue surrounding admissibility.
This Article approaches this issue in the light of scientific
evidence concerning the drug Bendectin. Some of the most restrictive admissibility determinations in recent years, including
22
Daubert itself, have occurred in cases involving this drug.
Part IV reviews several Bendectin cases in which the court excluded the plaintiffs expert testimony and re-examines these
rulings under a scientific validity standard. It inquires whether
this standard can support the Bendectin rulings or, to put the
question differently, whether the plaintiffs proffered testimony
in those cases was so invalid that a court could reasonably exclude it on that basis? This Part concludes that most of the restrictive rulings are questionable under a scientific validity
standard.
Despite the fact that a scientific validity standard does not
justify such restrictive rulings, courts nonetheless have
expressed a willingness to restrict scientific evidence in this
manner. Part V provides two explanations for the judicial proentific Uncertainty in HazardousSubstance Litigation,73 CORNELL L. Rzv. 469,
496-97 (1988).
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, assumed a more aggressive
stance in Richardsonv. Richardson-Merrell,Inc., affirming a trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendant:
The question whether Bendectin causes limb reduction defects is scientific in nature, and it is to the scientific community that the law must
look for the answer. For this reason, expert witnesses are indispensable in a case such as this. But that is not to say that the court's hands
are inexorable tied, or that it must accept uncritically any sort of opinion espoused by an expert merely because his credentials render him
qualified to testify.
857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989). The court
held that the expert testimony lacked an adequate foundation and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 703, distinguishing Ferebee on the ground that a
greater body of scientific evidence existed concerning Bendectin. Id. at 832. It
is not obvious why this distinction, even if true, should lead to the conclusion
that the plaintiff's evidence lacked an adequate foundation in Richardson but
not in Ferebee.
Divergent views can also be found at the trial level. Compare, for example,
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (following a passive approach comparable to Ferebee), affd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.)
(reducing damages), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986), with In re "Agent Orange" ProductsLiability Litigation,597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (following
a more restrictive approach comparable to Richardson),aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1987).
21. Black et. al., supra note 17, at 49.
22. See, e.g., Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829 (addressing the issue of whether
Benedictin causes limit reduction defects).
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pensity to exclude scientific evidence: courts want to achieve judicial efficiency and to improve jury decision making by
shielding juries from marginal science. The first objective is especially salient in mass tort cases or any situation in which the
same expert testimony is repeatedly presented. 2 3 The second
objective is relevant in all cases, including mass torts, that involve a complex body of scientific data. Although these are reasonable objectives, restrictive admissibility rulings should not be
the primary means of achieving them. Several factors make restrictive evidentiary rulings especially ill-suited devices for controlling the flow of information to juries. First, achieving
consistency across different types of cases is very difficult if not
impossible. Second, and more importantly, marginal science is
not the primary reason juries encounter substantial difficulty
with scientific evidence. Rather, the primary source of difficulty
is the way in which the legal process presents scientific evidence
to the jury. Part VI recognizes that restrictive admissibility rulings do little to solve this problem and proposes some alternatives that will assist the fact finder in understanding and
weighing scientific testimony in complex cases.
II. THE DAUBERT OPINION
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuler both suffer from limb reduction birth defects. They sued Merrell Dow, the manufacturer
of Bendectin, claiming that the morning-sickness drug, which
24
their mothers ingested during pregnancy, caused their defects.
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for summary
23. For example, in the area of eyewitness identification, expert testimony
rarely deals with the specifics of a given trial. Thus, experts proffer essentially
the same testimony from case to case. See Roger Elliott, Expert Testimony
About Eyewitness Identification: A Critique, 17 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 423,
423 (1993); Joseph Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1409, 1409-10 (1986). Appellate courts have

increasingly affirmed the exclusion of such testimony. See, e.g., United States

v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d
1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1357 (1993). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3rd Cir. 1991) (reversing a decision excluding expert testimony); Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1991)
(also reversing a decision excluding expert testimony).
24. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571
(S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993). The Daubert and Schuller cases are among 1,700 or so cases brought
against Merrell Dow claiming that Bendectin causes birth defects. See Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 359-62 (1992) [hereinafter Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation].
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judgment. 25 The trial court based its holding on several
grounds. First, the court held that only epidemiological evidence is relevant to the question of whether Bendectin is a teratogen 2 6 and that the published epidemiological research
contains no studies that demonstrate a statistically significant
association between Bendectin and birth defects. 27 Moreover,
the court found that the plaintiffs expert reanalyses of existing
data, which purported to reveal a significant relationship, were
insufficient to satisfy their burden of coming forward with statistically significant epidemiological evidence. 28 Thus, the court
concluded that the strongest inference a jury could draw from
the evidence was "that Bendectin could possibly have caused
to avoid the defendplaintiffs injuries," which was insufficient
29
ant's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a two page opin30
ion. Basing its analysis on Frye, the Ninth Circuit held the
plaintiffs expert testimony inadmissible because its underlying
methodology diverged substantially from the procedures and
techniques generally accepted in the field. 3 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, primarily to announce Frye's demise. 3 2 Noting the sharp division among the
circuits as to Frye's continued vitality, the Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test.33 The
25. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 576. Daubert is but one of many Bendectin
cases resolved at the summary judgment stage. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: the Testimony on Causationin the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 11, n.35 (1993) [hereinafter Sanders, From Science to Evidence].
26. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575. The court explained that all other evidence lacks a sufficient foundation under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Id. A
teratogen is a substance that causes birth defects.
27. Id. The court was incorrect on this point. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (noting six studies finding a correlation between Bendectin
use and injury).
28. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
29. Id. at 576.
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
31. Id. at 1129-31.
32. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992). The Court's refusal to grant certiorari in two
other Bendectin cases, which also resulted in summary judgment for the defendant, reveals its purpose. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 84 (1992) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); Lee v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 192 (1992) (same). The Ninth Circuit's exclusive reliance on Frye represents the primary distinction between these cases and
Daubert.
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792-93
(1993).
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Court grounded its analysis in the language of Federal Rule 702
which reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
34
otherwise.

The Court noted that the text of the rule did not preserve the
general acceptance standard, nor did its legislative history make
any mention of Frye. The Court thus concluded that a rigid
"general acceptance" standard would be contrary to the thrust of
the Federal Rules which5 were intended to lower barriers to ex3
pert opinion testimony.

Daubertis an incomplete opinion. The Court granted certiorari primarily to announce Frye's death and the ensuing discus-

sion of what standard should replace Frye is sketchy at best.
Although the Court was quite explicit that Rule 702 does not
incorporate Frye, it was far less clear about what Rule 702 does
require.3 6 The Court began by holding that Rule 702 modifies
Rule 402's directive to admit all relevant evidence. 3 7 This holding rejected the argument that Rule 702 speaks only to the expert's credentials and that a court may admit all evidence

consistent with Rules 401, 403, and 703 if presented by a qualified expert. 38 Rather, the Court held that Rule 702 requires reliability as well as relevance; evidence which is relevant but

unreliable is inadmissible. 39 This interpretation of Rule 702,
however, raises a fundamental question: What constitutes reliability? Importantly, the Court turned to science to answer that
question: To be reliable, the offering party must have acquired
40
the evidence through the "methods and procedures of science."

34. FED. R. Evm. 702.
35. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488
U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
36. Daubert's record offered little on which to base a discussion of what
standard should succeed Frye. For this reason, Judge Weinstein argued that
the Court erred in granting certiorari to Daubert and that a better choice would
have been Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); see Prod. Safety & Liability Rep. (BNA) 10
(Apr. 12, 1993).
37. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
38. See Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 12-30 (Apr. 26, 1993).
39. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. The Court may have borrowed this analysis from the Advisory Committee's proposed change in the language of Rule
702. See supra note 15.
40. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
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In this context, evidentiary reliability is very similar to "scientific validity."4 1 Although Daubert did not offer a systematic
presentation of what scientists mean when they use this term, it
did describe some broad parameters relevant to the validity inquiry. The Court emphasized that the 702 inquiry should be a
flexible one and that the factors set forth in other opinions 42 and
the legal literature 4 3 may prove valuable in determining
41. Id. at 2795 n.9. Bert Black has proposed a modification of Rule 702
that would require scientific evidence to be based on "scientifically valid reasoning" in order to be admissible. Black, supra note 11, at 611.
42. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Specifically, the Court referred to the
analysis in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). In Downing, the Third Circuit held that the admissibility of scientific testimony on the
accuracy of eyewitness identification was "not automatic but conditional." 753
F.2d at 1226. In order to be admissible, evidence must survive the trial court's
preliminary inquiry. In an in limine proceeding, the judge should balance: (1)
the reliability of the scientific principles the expert employed; against (2) the
likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury. Id. In addition, the trial court should examine the "fit" between the proffered scientific
testimony and the contested issues in the case. Id. at 1226. For a discussion of
Downingby Judge Becker, its author, see Becker & Orenstein, supra note 11, at
881.
The court in Christophersenv. Allied-Signal Corp. set out a similar test for
admissibility. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1280 (1992). In Christophersonthe Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, sustained the
trial judge's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 1116. The
plaintiff had argued that exposure to nickel/cadmium caused her husband's fatal colon cancer. Id. at 1108. The en bane opinion established a four factor test
of admissibility:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion
[under Rule 702];
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as
are relied upon by other experts in the field[, as Rule 703 requires];
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded
methodology [under Frye]; and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702, 703, and
the Frye test, whether.., the testimony's potential for unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value [under Rule 403].
Id. at 1110. The court noted that these four factors "lend themselves to sequential application." Id. For a further discussion of the Christopherson case, see
Bruce James, Fryed Expert Witnesses: The 5th Circuit Takes Charge of Scientific Testimony, 12 REv. LITIG. 171, 188 (1992).
43. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2797 n.12. The court cites 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-41, 702-42 and Mark McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV.
879, 911-912 (1982), both of which appear to have been taken from Black, supra
note 11, at 642, n.258. Weinstein & Berger list seven factors that a court may
use in assessing scientific evidence: (1) the technique's general acceptance in
the field; (2) the expert's qualifications and stature; (3) the use which has been
made of the technique; (4) the potential rate of error; (5) the existence of a specialized literature; (6) the novelty of the invention; and (7) the extent to which
the technique relies on the expert's subjective interpretation. WEINSTEIN &
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whether scientific testimony is reliable. The trial judge should
determine whether proffered evidence is scientifically valid by
examining the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert's testimony and the "fit" between the testimony and the factual issue presented to the judge or jury.44 Generally, the
expert's theory must be both testable and falsifiable. 45 The unreliability of a procedure and its potential rate of error 48 may
47
likewise merit exclusion.
Moreover, the trial court may consider a number of secondary, surrogate indicia of reliability. These include whether the
theory or technique has been subject to peer review, 48 whether
the results have been published 4 9 and, in a partial resurrection
of the Frye test, whether the expert's methods and reasoning enjoy general acceptance in a relevant scientific community. 50 Unlike the Frye test, however, which determines the value of
supra note 2, 702[03], at 702-41, 702-42, quoted in Black, supra note
11, at 642. Black also summarized eleven factors set forth by McCormick: (1)
the technique's potential error rate; (2) the existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; (3) the presence of safeguards in the technique's characteristics; (4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are
admissible; (5) the extent to which scientists in the relevant field have accepted
the technique; (6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced; (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results
explained; (8) the extent to which the courts and jury can verify the basic data;
(9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (10) the
evidence's probative significance in the circumstances of the case; and (11) the
care with which the expert employed the technique. Black, supra note 11, at
642 n.258 (quoting McCormick, supra note 5, at 911-912).
44. "An additional consideration under Rule 702-and another aspect of
relevancy-is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied
to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985). In Daubert,the
Supreme Court did not directly relate its discussion of "fit" to questions of validity. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to apply that concept in this context. A
particular piece of research may support one conclusion and not another. This
is frequently a question of external validity. See infra part III.D.
45. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
46. Id. at 2796-97 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-354
(7th Cir. 1989)).
47. The Court noted, almost in passing, that the "focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not the conclusions that they generate."
Id. at 2797. This statement will likely generate a good deal of controversy.
Bendectin plaintiffs have already picked up on this point and argued that their
expert testimony should not be excluded under Daubert when its methodology
is sound and the defense only objects to the expert's conclusion. See BENDECBERGER,

TIN Plaintiffs seek rehearing after CA 3 Affirms Defense Judgment, Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 2 (Sept. 1, 1993).
48. Daubert, 133 S. Ct. at 2797.

49. Id.
50. Id.
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science primarily through the surrogate of general acceptance, 51
the Daubert surrogates are secondary to a direct analysis of the

testimony's scientific validity.
Finally, the Court also noted that Rule 702 does not stand
alone. Rule 703 provides that a court may admit expert scientific opinion only if the facts or data are "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences on the subject." 5 2 Rule 706 allows the court to appoint its own expert when necessary. 5 3 Finally, the court may
employ Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony when its prejudicial effect or potential to confuse or54mislead the jury substantially outweighs its probative value.
In sum, Daubert clearly ended Frye's reign in the federal
courts. Rules 702 and 703 superseded Frye and supplanted its
"general acceptance" standard. Unfortunately, Daubert was far
less clear about precisely what these rules, especially Rule 702,
require. At the core of the Court's analysis of admissibility
under Rule 702, however, is the idea of scientific validity. The
51. See Black, supra note 11, at 629.
52. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The full text of Rule 703 reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED.

R. EvD. 703.

There has been confusion concerning the relationship of Rules 702 and 703.
See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Elect. Indus., Inc., 505 F.
Supp. 1313, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing the general relationship among
rules 702, 703 and 704), affid in part,rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Professor Imwinkelried has proposed that courts use
Rule 702 to regulate the expert's major premise-the principles and theories
upon which the expert bases its opinion, and that courts use Rule 703 to address the expert's minor premise-how the principles and theories apply to the
facts and data in the case at hand. See Tmwinkelried, supra note 11, at 14-16,
16-19. When the expert's testimony follows this major premise-minor premise
format, Professor Imwinkelried's analysis may prove especially useful. Expert
testimony, however, is not always easily broken into these two categories. See
David Faigman, Struggling to Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony,
76 MmN. L. REV. 877, 886 (1992).
53. See JOE S. CECIL & THoMS WILLGING, COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

706 (1993).
54. The full text of Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
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next section attempts to remedy Daubert'sfailure to define this
term.
III.

THE VARIETIES OF SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY

Daubert'sreferences to validity pose two primary problems:
the Court used the term as if it encompassed a unitary concept
with a single meaning; and the Court implied that validity must
be either present or absent and not a matter of degree. 55 Validity, however, is a complex concept with multiple dimensions.
For example, Cook and Campbell have identified four basic
types of validity: statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity, and external validity.5 6 Each may be
threatened to various degrees and in a number of ways.
A.

STATISTICAL CONCLUSION VALIDITY

Statistical conclusion validity is an important consideration
with all quantitative data. The typical threats to statistical conclusion validity have been widely discussed. 57 When researchers observe a co-variation between two variables, they may wish
to conclude, based on a statistical analysis, that the variables
are causally related. Tests of significance guard against the
danger that researchers will conclude that a relationship exists
when it does not. Typically, tests of statistical significance test
the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between two variables-that the relationship observed could be the result of
chance. 58 Unless a relationship is statistically significant, the
null hypothesis will not be rejected. 59 These tests, therefore,
guard against Type I errors, a validity threat that occurs when
one concludes that a relationship exists when, in fact, none
55. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795,
n.9 (1993).
56. THoMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUAsi-EXPERIMENTATION:
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD TESTING 37-39 (1979). The authors do
not claim that this list is exhaustive. Id.
57. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficieny of Evidence
in Toxic Substances Cases: The Legacy ofAgent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U.L. REv. 643, 682-94 (1992); Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation,
supra note 24, at 342-45.

58.
SEARCH

FREDERICK WILLIAMs, REAsONING WITH STATISTICS: HOW TO RnAD RE-

54 (3d ed. 1986).

59. By convention, the null hypothesis will not be rejected unless the
probability that chance caused a result is less than one in 20 (Alpha = .05) or,
occasionally, less than one in 100 (Alpha = .01). Id. at 59.

1400

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1387

does. 60 Thus, a researcher may reject a causal interpretation of
an apparent relationship that is not statistically significant.
Recent interest has focused on the problem which arises
when researchers attempt to assess causation with respect to
rare events such as limb reduction birth defects. 6 1 Whenever a
study has a relatively small number of subjects, statistical tests
will fail to detect a significant difference unless the relationship
is quite strong. This may cause a Type II error, which occurs
when one accepts the null hypothesis as true when it is actually
62
false. This threat to validity is one of low statistical power.
Researchers can employ a number of techniques to guard
against this threat, including meta-analysis which increases the
63
number of cases by combining the results of several studies.
Two other threats to statistical conclusion validity deserve
special mention. First, there is the error rate problem. Researchers engaged in a fishing expedition, sifting through a
large number of correlations in search of significant relationships, will inevitably find some. For example, if one concludes
that a relationship is significant if there is less than one chance
in twenty (Alpha = .05) that it would occur if the null hypothesis
is correct, a study of sixty relationships will produce three signif64
icant correlations even if no true causal relationships exist.
The unreliability of measurement techniques pose the second
threat. Epidemiological research depends on determining
whether individuals have or have not been exposed to a toxic
substance and whether or not they suffer from some adverse ef60.
61.
62.
wishes

WILLAmMs, supra note 58, at 65-67.
Green, supra note 57, at 653.
Power is a function of the study's sample size, the size of the effect one
to detect, and the significance criterion used to guard against Type I

error. JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCI-

ENCES 14 (2d ed. 1988).

63. See generally FREDERIC MARC WOLF, META-ANALYSIS: QUANTrATivE
METHODS FOR RESEARCH SYNTHESIs (1986) (basic text on meta-analysis);
Thomas R. Einarson et al., A Method for Meta-Analysis of Epidemiological
Studies, 22 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARmAcY 813, 813-23 (1988) (applying meta-analysis to Benedictin studies).
64. Thoughtful investigators assess their findings in light of this threat to
validity. For example, Shiono and Klebanoff examined births in Northern California for 58 categories of birth defects. Patricia Shiono & Mark Klebanoff,
Bendectin and Human Congenital Malformations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151, 152-55
(1989). Bendectin ingestion was significantly related to three types of defects:
lung defects, microcephaly (small head size) and cataracts. Id. at 152. The authors noted that three significant relationships out of 58 are "exactly the
number of significant relationships that would have been expected by chance"
when using 95% confidence intervals, and concluded that the three associations
"are unlikely to be causal." Id. at 155.
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fect. Coding errors occur when researchers treat individuals
who were not exposed as having been exposed and those exposed
as not exposed, or the researcher misdiagnoses the individuals.
Unreliable coding threatens validity
by inflating error variance
65
and attenuating true relationships.

B.

INTERNAL VALIDITY

Statistical conclusion validity presents a special case of internal validity, which Cook and Campbell define as "the approximate validation with which we infer that a relationship between
two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the absence of cause." 66 Threats to internal validity usually can be thought of as specification errors. Specification
errors occur when the researcher fails to consider a factor that
mediates the observed effect between two variables, either because it explains changes in both the "cause" and the "effect" or
intervenes between the "cause" and the "effect" and acts independently on the "effect."6 7 Among the threats to internal valid-

ity Cook and Campbell discuss are history (the threat that an
observed effect may be due to an event that takes place between
two points of measurement when this event is not the treatment
under investigation),68 testing (the threat that an effect may be
due to the number of times responses are measured),6 9 and selection (a threat that groups being compared are composed of
different types of individuals and, therefore, that observed differences are due to factors other than the treatment under in-

vestigation). 70 A basic advantage of experimental research is its
65. Plaintiff experts in Bendectin cases typically recode data in an attempt
to increase reliability. See infra part IV.B. (discussing reanalyses of epidemological data, in particular, those of plaintiff experts Dr. Swan and Dr. Done).
66. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 37.
67. See id. at 50.
68. Id. at 51. Bendectin defendants often introduce evidence indicating
that a measurable decrease in birth defects did not accompany rapid withdrawal of the drug from the market between 1981 and 1983. See infra note 117
and accompanying text. Discovery of a new teratogenic substance, introduced
into the environment over this same period, would constitute a history threat to
the validity of the conclusion that Bendectin does not cause birth defects.
69. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 52. For example, a prior opportunity to identify a suspect in a lineup may affect the courtroom identification of
the suspect.
70. Id. at 53. Selection effects take many different forms and often interact
with other threats to internal validity. One example of a potential selection
effect in Bendectin research derives from the fact that morning sickness is a
weak indicator that the fetus is healthy. See Margaret Weigel & Ronald Weigel, Nausea & Vomiting in Pregnancy and PregnancyOutcome, 96 BarriSH J.
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ability to control for many selection effects by randomly assigning individuals to treatments. 7 1 Of course in many situations, such as investigating the effect of toxic substances on
individuals, human experiments are impossible. In such cases,
the researcher can attempt to control selection threats by carefully matching cases and controls in case-control studies. 72
C.

CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

The third broad type of validity is construct validity. Confounding operations intended to represent one particular cause
or effect construct with some other construct usually threaten
construct validity.7 3 What one investigator may interpret as evidence of a causal relationship between constructs A and B, another investigator may interpret as a relationship between
constructs X and B or even X and y.74 There are several sources
of construct invalidity. One, experimenter expectancy, occurs
when the experimenter anticipates a certain outcome.7 5 Another, evaluation apprehension, arises when the subject wishes
to please the investigator. 76 Finally, hypothesis-guessing may
threaten construct validity when the subject attempts to guess
the hypothesis being tested and adjust his or her answers accordingly.7 7 For example, drug testing experiments often present construct validity concerns because any observed effect
between the drug and a therapeutic effect may be due, not to the
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1312 (1989). Thus, women who took Bendectin
were more likely to have a healthy baby than women who did not. But see Anne
Kricker et al., CongenitalLimb Deficiencies: MaternalFactorsin Pregnancy,26
AUSTRALIA-NEw ZEALAND J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 272 (1986) (study con-

cluding that "vomiting of (sic) pregnancy was associated with an increased risk
of longitudinal limb reduction defects").
71. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 55.
72. Even experimental designs cannot control for all threats to internal validity. For example, experiments cannot entirely control for differential mortality in treatment groups. Differential mortality obscures the interpretation of
other results because the remaining individuals in the two groups may no
longer be comparable on average. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 57.
This difference may be attributable to the treatment itself, such as when animals die from very large doses of a substance. See, e.g., Rochelle W. Tyl et al.,
Developmental Toxicity Evaluation of Bendectin in CD Rats, 37 TERATOLOGY
539, 540 (1988) (noting high "maternal mortality" in certain rat groups given
Bendectin).
73. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 59.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 66.
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chemical action of the drug, but rather to the psychological ex78
pectation that the pill will have a beneficial effect.
Another source of construct invalidity is the confounding of
constructs and levels of constructs. 7 9 One might conclude that A
does not cause B when the test involves very low levels of A. At
higher levels of A, however, the researcher might uncover a relationship.8 0 In an attempt to avoid this threat, laboratory animal
studies routinely expose animals to suspect drugs at more than
one dose level.8 '
A similar threat arises whenever one has but a single opera-2
tionalization of the cause or the effect: a mono-operation bias.
Early animal studies failed to detect the teratogenetic effects of
Thalidomide, in part because they used species unaffected by
the drug.8 3 Even when there are multiple operationalizations,
the use of a single method to measure a relationship threatens
validity.8 4 Wherever possible, researchers should employ multiple methods.
Assessing construct validity is frequently a question of convergence and divergence across measures. One is much more
likely to believe that a cause and effect relationship exists when
different measurements and methods converge to produce the
same result.8 5 Similarly, researchers are more likely to believe
that a cause and effect relationship of a particular type exists if
there is a divergence between measures and manipulations of
related but distinct constructs. 86

D.

EXTERNAL VALmiTY

Finally, there is external validity. Just as statistical conclusion validity is a special type of internal validity, construct va78. Id. at 61. In an effort to increase construct validity, scientists have
designed methods such as placebo controls and double blind designs. Id. In a

double blind design, neither the subject nor the researcher knows who is receiving the treatment and who is receiving the placebo. E.g., A.G. Hendrickx et al.,
Evaluationof Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Non-human Primates:Double-Blind
Study in Cynomolgus Monkeys, 32 TERATOLOGY 191 (1985).
79. COOK & CAmPBELL, supra note 56, at 67.
80. Id.
81. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation,supra note 24, at 323.
82. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 65.
83. Thalidomide is not a teratogen in all animal species. See Max Sherman
& Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 458, 461 (1986) (noting that Thalidomide is not a teratogen in
rats, mice or hampsters).
84. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 66.
85. This is known as convergent validity. Id. at 61.
86. This is sometimes called discriminant validity. Id.
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lidity is a type of external validity. External validity involves
the ability to generalize conclusions to particularpersons, set87
tings and times and to types of persons, settings and times.
Cook and Campbell list three basic threats to external validity,8 8 each of which can be expressed in terms of an interaction
between a treatment and some other factor. First, the potential
interaction between selection and treatment poses a threat to
external validity.8 9 If a study uncovers a cause and effect relationship, the researcher must determine to which categories of
individuals the relationship can be generalized. For example, if
a study includes only men as subjects, the researcher must determine whether the results can be generalized to women.
Other examples involve the ability to generalize across race,
ethnicity, and class. Other, more subtle threats to generalization may pose special problems in the courtroom. For instance,
jurors may rely upon the persuasiveness of experts as an indicator of the merits of their position. Litigants select testifying experts in part for their persuasiveness and, therefore, the
assumption that a causal relationship exists between persuasiveness and correctness may be unwarranted for the type of expert that appears as a witness in court.9 0
The interaction between setting and treatment creates a
second threat. A researcher may not be able to generalize studies done in one setting to other settings. All laboratory studies
are vulnerable to this threat.9 ' Even well crafted experiments
that do their best to increase external validity cannot insure
that their results can be transferred from the laboratory. Some
laboratory studies suffer from multiple threats to external validity. For example, some laboratory studies of jury decision making involve college sophomores rather than actual jurors.92 The
subjects read a written fact pattern and each individual "juror"
renders his or her own decision, instead of the "jury" issuing a
collective decision after deliberation. 93 Likewise, laboratory
animal studies encounter difficulty in extrapolating across both
dose rates and species. 9 4 Courts have frequently focused on
87. Id. at 71.
88. Id. at 73-74.
89. Id. at 73.
90. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1134 (1991).
91. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 74.
92. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JuRY 40 (1983).
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
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threats to external validity when refusing to admit expert
testimony.9 5
This brief review of validity's different facets indicates some
of the ways in which conclusions about causation may be in error. Statistical conclusion validity and other types of internal
validity concentrate on the danger of Type I or Type II errors,
drawing false positive or false negative conclusions about causation. Statistical conclusion validity deals with threats to internal validity caused by random error, the possibility that an
observed relationship could be due to chance. Other threats to
internal validity are due to the possible existence of bias
through factors that systematically affect the value of the means
of variables. 9 6 Construct validity and other types of externalyalidity concentrate on the danger of generalization. The principal
threat stems from the possible existence of an undetected interaction. 97 With respect to construct validity the danger is that an
effect can be obtained using one measure, such as individual juror judgments, and a different effect using a different measure,
such as collective jury judgments. The risk of undetected interaction effects is even easier to see with respect to other threats
to external validity, such as the interaction between selection
and treatment. 98 In each case, a relationship observed in one
circumstance may not apply in a different circumstance. The
next section employs these categories of scientific validity to discuss specific admissibility rulings in Bendectin cases.
IV. RESTRICTIVE ADMISSIBILITY RULINGS IN THE
BENDECTIN CASES
Bendectin has become a very important product, primarily
because it has precipitated a reanalysis of the judiciary's proper
role in assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence. For
nearly a decade, trial and appellate courts have wrestled with
the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert testimony that Bendectin is
95. For example, several courts, like the Dauberttrial court, have resisted
the introduction of expert opinion based on animal studies because of concerns
about external validity. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29 (discussing
the external validity problem posed by animal studies); infra text accompanying notes 134-48 (discussing courts' refusal to allow non-epidemiological evidence such as animal studies).
96. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 80.
97. Id. at 81.
98. Id. at 74.
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a teratogen.9 9 This section investigates whether Daubert's scientific validity analysis can explain and justify the Bendectin
cases' restrictive admissibility rulings and whether the excluded
testimony in those cases was so invalid that the courts properly
excluded it. The Article addresses this question in the context of
two specific themes that have arisen in Bendectin litigation: the
primacy of epidemiology, and the exclusion of testimony based
on a reanalysis of published epidemiological results.
A. THE PRimACY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
1. Evidence of a Causal Relationship
Bendectin is a substance that is not obviously harmful.10 0
It does not produce a signature disease and no generally accepted biological theory exist about how it produces its alleged
effect. Moreover, the correlation between the product and the
plaintiffs' injuries is not strong. The evidence as to the causal
relationship between the drug and birth defects comes in five
basic types: structure-activity, in vitro research, animal studies,
epidemiology, and secular trend analysis.10 1
Structure-activity. Substances with similar chemical structures may have similar effects on the human body. Bendectin
contains doxylamine succinate, an antihistamine acting as an
antinauseant. 0 2 Some antihistamines are known teratogens
and plaintiff experts point to this structural similarity. 0 3
In vitro. In vitro research involves exposing cells or organs
maintained in a culture to a substance.10 4 One study indicates
that Bendectin inhibits certain limb bud cell differentiation' 0 5
99. A list of all reported Bendectin opinions through 1991 can be found in
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 410-18.
100. See Louis Lasagna & Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and the Language
of Causation,in PHANTOM Risic ScrENTric INFERENCE AND THE LAW 100, 100-

01 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds., 1993). Other mass exposures that currently
fit into this category include exposure to Agent Orange, PCBs, certain toxic
waste dumps, breast implants, and electro-magnetic fields.
101.

Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberationsin a Complex Case: Havner v.

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 JusT. Sys. J. 45, 52-53 (1993) [hereinafter Sanders, Jury Deliberation].

102. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 317.
103. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946 n.8
(3d Cir. 1990).
104. See, e.g., Stuart Freeman et al., Post-implantationEmbryo Culture for
Studies of Teratogenesis,in BIOCHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY: A PRAcTIcAL APPROACH

83 (K. Snell & B. Mullock eds. 1987) (assessing studies of teratogenesis).
105. John R. Hassell & Elizabeth A. Horigan, Chondrogenesis:A Model Developmental System for MeasuringTeratogenicPotentialof Compounds, 2 TERATOGENESIS, CARCINoGENEsIs, & MUTAGENESIS 325, 325-27 (1982).
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and another suggests
that Bendectin may be a weak DNA dam10 6
aging agent.
Animal studies. In vivo studies examine the effects of a substance on animals. Researchers have conducted Bendectin
animal studies on chicks, rats, rabbits, and primates. 10 7
As
plaintiff experts note, some studies report a relationship between Bendectin or one of its ingredients and a teratogenic effect. For example, one primate study found that the drug caused
a delay in the closure of the ventricular septa.' 0 8 On the other
hand, several studies have failed to find a correlation between
Bendectin and birth defects.' 0 9
Epidemiology. Epidemiological studies compare the incidence of birth defects among those exposed to and those not exposed to a substance. There are two general ways of making
such comparisons: cohort studies and case-control studies."10
Cohort studies compare the incidence of defects among groups of
persons exposed to the substance and groups of persons not exposed."' Case-control studies match a group of persons who
have the injury in question with another group that does not
have that injury." 12 The studies then compare exposure rates
for the two groups. Nearly 40 published epidemiological studies
discuss Bendectin. 1 3 In no individual study did the authors
conclude that Bendectin is a teratogen. In six studies, however,
the authors found at least one significant correlation between
Bendectin use and some injury and concluded that, although a
single study alone is insufficient to support an attribution of
causation, an effect might exist." 4 In the remaining 33 studies
106. John D. Budroe et al., A Study of the Potential Genotoxicity of
Methapyrilene and Related Antihistamines using the HepatocyteiDNA Repair
Assay, 135 MUTATION RES. 131, 135-36 (1984).
107. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation,supra note 24, at 394.
108. A.G. Hendrickx et al., Evaluation of Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Nonhuman Primates: Ventricular Septal Defects in Prenatal Macaques and
Baboon, 32 TERATOLOGY 179, 179-89 (1985); A.G. Hendrickx et al., supra note
78, at 194.
109. For a list of the published animal studies, see Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation,supra note 24, at 403.
110. Leon Gordis, EstimatingRisk and Inferring Causality in Epidemiology,
in EPIDEMIOLOGY AND HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 51, 52 (Leon Gordis ed. 1988).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. For a list of published epidemiological studies through 1991, see Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 404-06.
114. Pamela Aselton et al., Pyloric Stenosis and Maternal Bendectin Exposure, 120 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 251 (1984); Jose F. Cordero et al., Is Bendectin a
Teratogen?, 245 JAMA 2307 (1981); Brenda Eskenazi & Michael B. Bracken,
Bendectin (Debendox) as a Risk Factorfor Pyloric Stenosis, 144 Am. J. OBSTT-
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the authors either drew no conclusion or concluded that no sta115
tistical relationship existed.
Secular trend. Secular trend data, which is similar to epidemiology, compares the total reported incidence of various types
of birth defects with the volume of Bendectin sales and prescriptions. This method investigates whether increases or reductions
in birth defects paralleled the rapid increase in Bendectin prescriptions in the 1970s or the precipitous drop in prescriptions in
the early 1980s.
In recent years defense experts have concentrated their testimony on the epidemiological and secular trend evidence. As to
the epidemiological data, Bendectin defendants have argued
that, taken as a group, the studies indicate that Bendectin is not
teratogenic. 116 They have also reviewed secular trend evidence
that indicates no significant decrease in birth defects after
Bendectin manufacturers withdrew the product from the marRiCS & GYNECOLOGY 919 (1982); G.T. Gibson et al., Congenital Anomalies in
Relation to the Use of Doxylamine/Dicyclomine and other Antenatal Factors:
An Ongoing Prospective Study, 1981 MED. J. AUSTL. 410 (1981); J. Golding et
al., MaternalAnti-nauseants and Clefts of Lip and Palate, 1983 HUMAN ToxiCOLOGY 63 (1983); Kenneth J. Rothman et al., Exogenous Hormones and Other
Drug Exposures of Children with CongenitalHeartDisease, 109 AM. J. EPIDMEMIOLOGY 433, 435 (1979).
115. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 395.
116. Einarson, Leeder & Koren included 17 studies in a meta-analysis examining whether first-trimester Bendectin ingestion caused any birth defect.
See Einarson et al., supra note 63. The overall odds ratio was 1.01, X2 = 0.05, p
= 0.815. They also conducted separate meta-analyses for cohort and case control studies. For cohort studies (N = 12) the ratio was 0.95, X2 = 0.66, p = 0.418.
For case control (N = 5) studies the ratio was 1.27, X2 = 2.71, p = 0.10. Id. at
819-20. The authors concluded that these meta-analyses confirm previous subjective analyses that Bendectin is not associated with human teratogenic outcomes. Id. at 822; see also Leslie J. Sheffield & Ron Batagol, The Creation of
Therapeutic Orphans-Or,What Have We Learnt From the Debendox Fiasco?,
143 MED. J. AUSTL. 143, 144-45 (1985) (noting "great uniformity" in studies
"finding no teratogenic effect of Debendox").
The odds ratio is the cross product in a 2 x 2 table. In a cohort study examining exposed and unexposed individuals, the odds ratio is the ratio of the odds
of injury if the person was exposed, to the odds of injury if the person was not
exposed.
ODDS RATIO IN A COHORT STUDY

Injured
a
c

Not
Injured
b
d

Exposed
a/b = ad
Not Exposed
o
F-e
In a case-control study comparing injured subjects to "controls" without the injury, the odds ratio is the ratio of the odds that the injured subjects suffered
exposure to the odds that the controls suffered exposure.
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ket." 7 Plaintiff experts, on the other hand, have devoted substantial attention to structure-activity, in vitro, and animal
studies, as well as to reanalyses of epidemiological data." 8
2. Problems with Non-Epidemiological Evidence
Structure-activity, in vitro, and animal studies each pose
substantial validity questions. Most problematic, perhaps, is
the structure-activity evidence. Although research exists linking antihistamines to teratogenic injuries, several factors undermine its validity." 9 First, even minor changes in molecular
structure can alter a substance's effect. 120 The metabolic process stands as an unknown intervening variable between the
original chemical structure and the adverse effect. Thus, structure-activity data presents a problem of internal validity.
In vitro evidence is superior to structure-activity evidence
because it does investigate the effect of the Bendectin ingredients. In vitro evidence suffers, however, from the same internal
validity problem confronting structure-activity data because the
relevant chemical compound does not go through the metabolic
process before affecting the culture. 12 1 Moreover, the confounding of constructs and levels of constructs threatens this
type of evidence. For example, the study which found that
Bendectin inhibited cell differentiation employed a unit of measure called the teratogenic potential. 2 2 The authors observed
ODDS RATIO IN A CASE-CONTROL STMY

History of Exposure
No History of Exposure

Cases (With
Injury)
a
c

Controls
(Without
Injury)
b
d

a/c
R

=

ad
-

For example, if one conducted a case-control study with the following results
a=60, b=40, c=40, d=60, the odds ratio would be (60*60)/(40*40) = 3600/1600 =
2.75. See HAROLD KAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EPIDEMIOLOGIC METHODS 38-45
(1983).
117. Robert L. Brent, Bendectin and InterventricularSeptal Defects, 32 TERATOLOGY 317, 317 (1985); see D.W.G. Harron et al., Debendox and Congenital
Malformations in Northern Ireland, 281 BRrr. MED. J. 1379, 1381 (1980).
118. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 43-44.
119. C.T.G. King et al., Antihistamines and Teratogenicityin the Rat, 147 J.
PHARMACOLOGY & ExPERmMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 391, 395 (1965).
120. Green, supra note 57, at 658.
121. O.P. Flint, An In Vitro Test for Teratogens Using Cultures of Rat Embryo Cells, reprinted in IN VITRo METHODS IN TOXICOLOGY 339, 354 (C.Y. Atterwill & C.E. Steele eds. 1987).
122. Hassell & Horigan, supra note 105, at 327, 330.
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an effect for Bendectin at a dose of .05 mg/ml. 123 Caffeine produces a similar effect at 2.3mg/ml and vitamin A does so at
.000013 mg/ml. 124 It is difficult to translate such dosages in in
vitro studies to the doses humans actually experience.
Because animal studies require ingestion of a drug, they do
not confront all of the threats to internal validity that structureactivity and in vitro studies face. They do, however, confront external validity threats. Some of the threats result inevitably
from reasonable tradeoffs designed to avoid threats to internal
validity. Among these tradeoffs, dose rates pose the most important problem. Researchers usually give animals a substance at
a dose rate much higher than humans would ingest. 125 Several
compelling reasons merit this practice. Animal research is expensive and time consuming. Many substances that are suspected of causing harm do so in only in a small percentage of
organisms exposed at a rate similar to that found in the environment. 12 6 Subjecting the animals to dose rates no greater than
typical environmental rates would require a very large N to
avoid a high probability of a Type II error. Thus, in order to
guard against threats to statistical conclusion validity, researchers increase the dose so that a larger percentage of animals will
react adversely. 127 This closage, however, creates a significant
threat to external validity. The high doses create the potential
for construct validity problems similar to those presented in in
vitro tests: confounding constructs with levels of constructs. At
sufficiently high dose levels almost all substances are teratogenic.' 28 Moreover, in the case of suspected teratogens, very
high animal dose rates begin to poison the mother and cause
fetal injuries as the byproduct of maternal toxicity and not the
substance's teratogenic effect. 12 9
123. Id. at 330.
124. Id. The authors do not express an opinion about whether Bendectin is
dangerous to humans when taken in normal therapeutic doses. Id. at 330-31.
125. Michael D. Hogan & David G. Hoel, Extrapolationto Man, reprintedin
PRINCIPLES & METHODS OF TOXICOLOGY 879, 879-80 (Wallace Hayes ed., 2d ed.
1989).
126. Jack L. Landan & W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility ofAnimal Studies to Prove Causationin Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L.
REV. 521, 537 (1988-89).
127. Even with high dose rates, the relatively small number of animals in
some experiments may create a threat to statistical conclusion validity when
searching for a weak causal link.
128.

Thomas H. Shepard, Human Teratogenicity, 33 ADVANCES IN PEDIAT-

Rics 225, 227 (1986).
129. See Tyl et al., supra note 72, at 549.
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Even at more modest dose rates, extrapolation difficulties
pose significant threats to external validity. Assuming a positive result in an animal study, toxicologists must then extrapolate a predicted effect at a dose level humans actually
experience. No single agreed upon model for this extrapolation
130
exists and competing models produce different predictions.
Nor is dose rate the only necessary adjustment. There must also
be an adjustment for the fact that species are of different sizes
and mature and age at different rates. Again, there is no agreed
upon formula for this adjustment, and different
scaling factors
13 1
lead to different estimates of human effects.
One reason toxicologists tolerate the threat to external validity posed by high dose rates is that most animal studies are
designed to be part of the regulatory process rather than part of
proof of causation in litigation. When testing a new drug the
critical question is whether a teratogenic effect might arise in
humans even though it is not observed in animals. The crucial
error to avoid is a Type II error. When litigants take these studies to the courtroom, however, the central question becomes
whether a known effect in a test animal is probative of whether
a human effect exists at a much lower dose rate. Although it is
quite rare for a known human teratogen to fail to cause birth
defects in at least some animals, 13 2 it is more likely that a substance for which there is no evidence of human teratogenicity
will produce an effect in some animal species.1 3 3
130. For example, varying statistical models for extrapolating carcinogenic
effects produce different results when the laboratory dose rate is substantially
greater than the environmental dose rate. OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45
Fed. Reg. 5002, 5184-85 (1980); David S. Salsburg, Statistics and Toxicology:
An Overview, in ScmNTrFc CONSIDERATIONS IN MONITORING AND EVALUATING
ToxicOLOGIcAL RESEARCH 123, 130-31 (Edward Gralla ed., 1981).
131. See James P. Leape, QuantitativeRisk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens,4 HARv. ENvT'. L. REV. 86, 98-99 (1980). Comparisons of risk estimates of cancer based on extrapolations from animal data with
actual human epidemiological data indicate that only half the substances examined yielded accurate estimates. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 126, at
548 (indicating that many estimates err by factors of 10 or more).
132. LAN C.T. NISBET & NATHAN J. KARCH, CHEMICAL HAZARDS TO HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 98-99 (1983).

133. A 1980 FDA study reported that of 165 compounds with no reported
human teratologic effects, only 28% appeared negative in all animal species

tested. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,816, 69,823 (1980); NISBET & KARcH, supra note 132, at
105. For explanations of how and why effects in humans differ from various
animal species, see EDwARD J. CALABRESE, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL ExTRAPoLATION 237-38 (1983); Gary P. Carlson, FactorsModifying Toxicity, in Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HUMAN RIsK: PRINCIPLES OF DATA INTERPRETATION 47, 49 (R.

Tardiff & J. Rdricks eds., 1987). One example is reported in Turpin v. Merrell
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Court Attitudes Towards Non-Epidemiological Data

The validity threats facing non-epidemiological data have
caused several courts to refuse to allow Bendectin plaintiffs to
introduce this type of evidence or prevail thereon. 3 4 Courts
have reached this conclusion by a number of different paths.
One group has directed verdicts or ordered summary judgment
for the defendant without ruling on the admissibility of the
plaintiffs non-epidemiology experts. 35 These are properly
characterized as sufficiency rulings; the court concludes that the
plaintiff cannot survive a directed verdict or a summary judgment motion because the causal proof cannot sustain a verdict
for the plaintiff. For example, in Brock v. Merrell Dow, the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff could not prevail without epidemiological evidence of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and the plaintiffs limb reduction defect.' 3 6
Because the opinion followed a jury trial, the Fifth Circuit did
not need to rule on the admissibility of the plaintiffs non-epidemiological evidence.1 37 In Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1 8 however, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendant and held that the
plaintiffs proffered testimony was insufficient to sustain a

verdict.139

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1359 n.4 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992). Several animal studies have found that cortisone
causes severe cleft palate birth defects in several animal species, but not in
humans. Alfred M. Bongiovanni & Arthur J. McPadden, Steroids DuringPregnancy and Possible Fetal Consequences, 11 FERTLIY & STEmLTY 181, 184-85
(1960). It may be, of course, that some chemicals with no apparent carcinogenic
or teratogenic effect are not in fact completely harmless because of significant
limits on the ability of epidemiological studies to detect small risks.
134. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,
575 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993).
135. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307,
311-13 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
136. Id. at 313.
137. Id. at 313-15; see Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, No. 1392-540-CV, 1994 WL 86436 (Tex. Ct. App. March 17, 1994)
138. 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).
139. Id. at 1360-61. The court refused to conclude that animal studies could
never form the basis of an opinion that a substance is a human teratogen, only
that the plaintiffs animal studies could not. Id. at 1360. The Turpin district
court excluded much of the plaintiffs evidence under Rule 703 but held in the
alternative that, even if admissible as a matter of law, the evidence could not
support a verdict for the plaintiff. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 737, 744 (E.D. Ky. 1990); see also Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of summary judgement
for defendant by relying on Turpin), cert. denied, 62 USLW 3618 (1994).
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Another group of courts simply holds that non-epidemiological evidence is inadmissible. 140 Some, such as the Ninth Circuit
in Daubert, reach this result under the Frye test. 14 1 More relevant in the post-Frye environment, however, are those cases
which excluded the plaintiff's testimony under Federal Rule 702
or 703.142 In Lynch v. Merrell-NationalLaboratories,14 3 one of
the earliest opinions to take this position, the trial court entered
summary judgment for the defendant after concluding that testimony on human teratogenicity based on structure-activity, in
vitro, or animal studies was not of the "type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field" and therefore inadmissible.' 4 4 A similar analysis can be found in Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell,Inc.:
140. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
141. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
142. An important non-Bendectin case with a similar ruling is In re "Agent
Orange"ProductsLiability Litigation. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), a'ffd,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). There, Judge
Weinstein refused to allow the plaintiffs experts to base their opinion on
animal studies, primarily because of external validity concerns:
The many studies on animal exposure to Agent Orange, even plaintiffs'
expert concedes, are not persuasive in this lawsuit ....
There is no
evidence that plaintiffs were exposed to the far higher concentrations
involved in both the animal and industrial exposure studies. Cf In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 782
(E.D.N.Y.1984). The animal studies are not helpful in the instant case
because they involve different biological species. They are of so little
probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be inadmissible.
See FED. R. EvID. 401-403. They cannot be an acceptable predicate for
an opinion under Rule 703.
In re "Agent Orange", 611 F.Supp. at 1241; see In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB
Litigation, Nos. 86-2229, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16287, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,
1992) (holding that animal studies are of limited reliability when attempting to
apply their results to humans).
143. 646 F. Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986), affd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 866-67. The court noted the following:
None of the animal studies submitted by the plaintiffs provide evidence of teratogenicity at doses comparable to the human therapeutic
dose of Bendectin. These animal studies are therefore lacking in probative value and must be found inadmissible.... For similar reasons,
this Court must reject the plaintiffs' proffered evidence of in vitro studies and studies of analogous chemical structures as a basis for the
plaintiffs' experts testimony.... This Court also cannot find, pursuant
to Rule 703, that such studies are "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field." Dr. John Hassell, the author of one
such in vitro study, has expressly recognized that neither his technique
nor any other in vitro system has yet been validated as an accurate
predictor of teratogenicity in animals or humans.... Thus, a careful
review of the material before this Court indicates that the only relevant, probative, and non-misleading evidence on the issue of Bendec-
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These three types of studies then-chemical, in vitro, and in vivocannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that Bendectin
caused the birth defects at issue in this case. Studies of this kind, singly or in combination, are not capable of proving causation in human
beings in the face14of
5 the overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence.

The key to Richardson is its comparative analysis. The court
essentially held that structure-activity, in vitro and animal
studies cannot form a sufficient foundation when substantial epidemiological evidence exists.1 46 Similar language can be found
in the district court opinions in Lee v. Richardson-Merrell,
14
Inc.,147 and Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 8
both of which excluded non-epidemiological evidence.
Whether such non-epidemiological evidence should be excluded under a scientific validity standard turns on how precisely one poses the issue. If one asks whether, standing alone,
structure-activity, in vitro and animal studies should be excluded, the answer depends on which type of evidence is under
consideration. Inevitably, validity is a matter of degree. All
types of non-epidemiological evidence suffer from some external
validity problems when used to address whether Bendectin is a
human teratogen at normal dose levels. The animal studies
data, however, confronts far fewer problems and have some
strengths vis-a-vis epidemiological studies. If the only evidence
tin's role in the causation of birth defects are the controlled
observations of human beings, documented in more than 25 published
epidemiological studies.
Id.
145. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
146. In situations where there is not a substantial body of epidemiological
data, however, courts have been more accepting of animal study data. See, e.g.,
Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (D. Md. 1986), affd sub
noma., Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987).
147. 772 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-33 (W.D. Tenn. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 1577 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 197 (1992).
148. 736 F. Supp. 737, 739-44 (E.D. Ky. 1990). The courts in Lee and Turpin
employed a test developed in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.
1977) and United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987), affd, 487
U.S. 931 (1988). The Green court set forth a four-prong test for admissibility:
(1) a qualified expert must be offered; (2) the expert must testify on a proper
subject; (3) the expert must testify in conformity with a generally accepted explanatory theory; and (4) the probative value of the testimony must outweigh
any prejudicial effect. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268. Kozminski further refined the
third element by requiring that the explanatory theory must have: (a) received
at least some exposure within the scientific peerage to which it belongs; (b) been
subjected to peer evaluation to determine its scientific validity and reliability;
and (c) achieved general acceptance within the scientific community to which it
belongs. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1201.
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available to a "first plaintiff"149 expert is an animal study indicating a teratogenic effect on mice exposed to Bendectin at a
dose rate one order of magnitude greater than a human dose, it
is difficult to see why this should not be admissible. The question becomes more difficult when the only evidence is an in vitro
study indicating DNA damage to cells exposed to Bendectin. In
an extreme case, where the only available evidence is a structure-activity study relating some antihistamines to birth defects, the threats to internal and external validity may indeed be
so large that the evidence cannot form the basis of an expert
opinion that Bendectin is a teratogen. Thus, judging each type
of evidence on its own, a court might reasonably exclude an expert's conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen if it is based
solely on structure-activity evidence, but might admit an opinion based on animal studies.
The courts that have excluded non-epidemiological data in
the Bendectin cases have not approached the problem in this
way. They have not independently assessed the admissibility of
each type of evidence as if it were the only available evidence
and they been hesitant to conclude that plaintiffs can never

reach a jury without epidemiological evidence. Instead, they
have carved out an exception for Bendectin cases because of the
rich epidemiological data available. 150 Whether the admissibil149. A "first plaintiff' is the first individual to claim that a toxic substance
causes injury. This individual must frequently litigate on an undeveloped scientific record. See Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 349.
150. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir.
1988). At least two courts have refused to adopt this unique approach in
Bendectin cases. In Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the court
concluded as follows:
Animal studies are generally relied upon by experts determining the
link between a drug and birth defects and the same is true for chemical
analysis. While the Court will leave open the question of the admissibility of particular studies during the trial of this matter, the Court
cannot now preclude all such studies under Rule 703.
737 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D. Idaho 1990). In In Re Bendectin ProductsLiability
Litigation, Judge Rubin, the trial judge who presided over the 1985 Multidistrict Litigation Bendectin Trial in Ohio, also refused to hold non-epidemiological evidence inadmissible under Rule 703, noting the following:
The division in the scientific community over whether epidemiological
studies should be relied upon exclusively necessitates the inescapable
conclusion that experts may reasonably rely upon other types of data
when forming an opinion as to the teratogenicity of Bendectin. A contrary finding is unjustifiable without a pronouncement in this circuit
that, as a matter of law, epidemiological studies are the sole basis upon
which an expert may reasonably rely when forming an opinion on a
drug's teratogenicity.
732 F. Supp. 744, 749 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citations omitted).
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ity of one type of evidence should vary depending on the existence of other evidence poses an interesting, but different,
question. More precisely, should the admissibility of non-epidemiological evidence turn on the existence of epidemiological evidence? Applying a validity analysis under Rule 702, the answer
is no. Under that standard, if the threats to internal and external validity do not render a piece of evidence unreliable, that
evidence does not become unreliable simply because better data
is available.
The Bendectin courts, however, have not relied on Rule 702
as the basis of their opinions. Rather, most have found the evidence inadmissible under Rule 703 and held that non-epidemiological findings are not the type of evidence relied upon by
experts in the field.1 51 The propriety of this approach depends
on the structure of the plaintiffs entire case. An everyday example illustrates this point. When the only evidence whether a
dog walked across the front lawn last night is the report of three
eyewitnesses who say they saw no dog, this constitutes the best
evidence available and is admissible. When, on the other hand,
it snowed during the night, the presence of dog tracks across the
lawn greatly diminishes the value of the eyewitness testimony.
Similarly, when animal studies supply the only available evidence that a substance causes harm, teratology experts may reasonably rely on this finding. When a large and rich body of
epidemiological data exists, however, experts may cease to rely
on the animal study as the primary basis of their opinion about
whether the substance is a teratogen. Nevertheless, an independent Rule 702 validity analysis indicates why courts
should refuse to conclude that non-epidemiological evidence is
inadmissible even when a large body of epidemiological data
exists.
One could argue, under Rule 703, that it would be inappropriate to form one's opinion about whether Bendectin is a teratogen based entirely on non-epidemiological evidence.
Something like a "best scientific evidence" rule might render an
opinion based solely on such evidence inadmissible. 152 This does
not mean, however, that the best alternative is to base an opinion solely on the epidemiological evidence. On the contrary,
from a scientific validity perspective it would be preferable to
151. See, e.g., Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829-32.
152. See Green, supra note 57, at 676 (noting that the probity of toxicology
evidence, especially animal studies, varies inversely with the quality of the epidemiological evidence).
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form one's opinion about Bendectin based on all of the available
evidence: epidemiological, animal studies, in vitro and perhaps
even structure-activity. This conclusion focuses on questions of
construct validity. Any single operation-any single study-is
threatened by a potential mono-operation bias. 153 Cook and
Campbell note: "Since single operations both under represent
constructs and contain irrelevancies, construct validity will be
lower in single exemplar research than in research where each
construct is multiple operationalized in order to triangulate on
the referent." 154 Thus, confounders or other irrelevancies, may
affect the results of a single epidemiological study. Multiple
studies provide greater certainty that the observed relationships
does in fact represent the concepts under investigation.
Even multiple epidemiological replications suffer from
mono-method bias. "[WIhen all the manipulations are presented
in the same way, or all the measures use the same means of
recording responses, then the method is itself an irrelevancy
whose influence cannot be dissociated from the influence of the
target construct."' 55 As a method, epidemiology has many
strengths, but it also has weaknesses. Because it is not an experimental method, it inevitably suffers from some internal validity problems. On the other hand, because animal studies are
experiments, it is relatively more certain that the substance experimentally manipulated caused any observed effect. Each
type of evidence addresses some of the weaknesses of the other.
The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
Bendectin plaintiffs have never argued that epidemiological
data should be disregarded. On the contrary, plaintiff experts
who are prepared to testify that more likely than not Bendectin
caused the plaintiffs birth defect, have based their conclusion on
all available evidence, including animal studies and epidemiological research. 156 Excluding non-epidemiological evidence because better, epidemiological evidence exists is erroneous under
a scientific validity standard. Within the context of a scientific
validity discussion, the admissibility of such evidence is not contingent upon the existence of other, arguably better evidence.
Likewise, exclusion under Rule 703 conflicts with common scientific understandings of construct validity and mono-method bias.
153. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 65.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 66.
156. See, e.g., Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100, 1104-08 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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THE EXCLUSION OF THE REAALYsIs OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
STUDIES

Plaintiff efforts to produce a prima facie case of causation
have never depended entirely on non-epidemiological evidence.
Throughout, Bendectin plaintiffs have offered epidemiological
evidence in the form of a reanalysis of existing epidemiological
studies. 157 Epidemiological studies have typically escaped the
criticism that they are so invalid as to be inadmissible. Nevertheless, plaintiff experts usually design the reanalyses to correct
for alleged threats to the validity of results reported in published epidemiological research. 158 They have focused on
threats to statistical conclusion validity, primarily stemming
from unreliable measurement and the relatively small Ns of
many studies. 5 9 The most serious measurement threat derives
from the fact that many of the studies were unable to determine
exactly when the expectant mothers took Bendectin. For example, limb reduction defects occur when the limbs are first forming, a period that lasts approximately two weeks. 160 If
researchers included women who took Bendectin after this period among the exposed group, the study will underestimate any
effect. 16 1 The effect of changes in defining exposure can be dramatic.1 62 The existence of doxylamine succinate in products
such as Unisom adds another potential source of bias. 163 Unless
researchers ask women whether they took such products during
pregnancy, they may code certain women as unexposed who in
fact ingested Bendectin's most suspect ingredient. As in the
case of misclassification due to time of ingestion, coding errors
will underestimate any effect.
157. See Testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan, morning session, Sept. 19,
1991, at 43-64, Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-3915-F
(Tex. Dist. Ct., 214th Jud. Dist., March 17, 1994) (on file with the author).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Green, supra note 57, at 650.
161. When it is unknown whether the mother ingested the drug during organogenesis, the study will mistakenly categorize women who took the drug too
late in their pregnancy for it to cause a defect as women exposed to Bendectin.
These women should be counted as "controls," women not exposed to the drug.
The precise consequences of this misclassification are difficult to assess. For
"negative cases'"-women whose children do not have defects-the misclassification underestimates the drug's teratogenic. For "positive cases," however, the
misclassification overestimates the teratogenic effect. Overall, such misclassification introduces an error term that will attenuate any effect that does exist.
See Green, supra note 57, at 650 n.32.
162. See id. at 650.
163. PHYsIcIAN's DESK REFERENCE 2642 (1994).
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In addition, because limb reduction defects, which underlie
many Bendectin claims, are rare events, the number of individuals who suffer from a given defect and whose mothers took
Bendectin is relatively small. As a consequence, there is a substantial risk of making a Type H error due to low statistical
power. For example, five cohort studies which report limb reduction injuries together contain only eleven such cases. 16 4 One
way to increase statistical power is to conduct case-control studies that purposefully pick as cases individuals who exhibit the
injury under investigation. 16 5 Four published case-control studies include limb reduction defects with a total N of 312 cases, 61
of whom had mothers who were exposed to the drug. 16 6 Only
two of the studies had Ns sufficiently large to afford a 50%
chance of detecting a relative risk of two or smaller. 167 In fact,
except for one case-control study, 168 the total data on limb reduction defects is quite limited.' 6 9
164. See Jon Powell, How to Tell the Truth With Statistics: A New Statistical Approach to Analyzing the Bendectin EpidemiologicalDatain the Aftermath

of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 Hous. L. REv. (forthcoming
1994) (manuscript at 58, of file with author). These studies together have an N
of nearly 97,000 and yet they contain only 113 total limb reduction defects. Id.
165. In contingency table analyses typical of epidemiological research, the
frequency of exposure in the population (the percentage of pregnant women using Bendectin) and the incidence of the effect (the frequency of limb reductions)
both affect the study's power. See generally JAMEs J. SCHLESSELMAN, CASECONTROL STUnms: DESIGN, CONDUCT,

ANALYSIS (1982). In cohort studies the

frequency of an effect in any given study sample approximates the frequency in
the population from which the sample was drawn. When the effect is very rare
one needs very large samples to avoid Type II errors. In case-control studies
the incidence of the effect is set at an artificially high level because researchers
purposefully pick cases that exhibit the injury. Thus, when the incidence of an
effect is rare in the population, case-control studies are much more powerful
than cohort studies. See CARL F. CRAYNOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAw 36 (1993); KAHN, supra note 116, at 54.
166. See Powell, supra note 164, at 58.
167. Id. at 61. This assumes an Alpha of.05 and a two tailed test of significance. Id.
168. Janet McCredie et al., The Innocent Bystander: Doxylamine/Dicyclomine, Pyridoxine and Congenital Limb Defects, 140 MED. J. AUsTL. 525
(1984).
169. Pooling and meta analysis combine data from several studies, producing a larger N and, ceteris paribus,greater statistical power. See generally Einarson et al., supra note 63 (presenting a step-by-step method for conducting a
meta-analysis of epidemiological data); Wolf, supra note 63 (basic text on metaanalysis). Even these techniques cannot completely rule out the possibility that
Bendectin is a weak teratogen. Powell performed meta analyses on studies
with limb reduction data. See Powell, supra note 164. In a meta analysis of
case-control studies, the Odds Ratio was 1.1, with a Chi Square of .2, p. < .65,
and a 95% confidence interval of 0.56-2.17. A meta analysis of cohort studies
generated an Odds Ratio of .89, with a Chi Square of .03, p. < .86 and a 95%
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Plaintiff experts Shanna Swan and Alan Done have criticized the published studies for all of these reasons and challenged the statistical conclusion validity of their results.' 7 0
They have also recoded and reanalyzed the data in some studies.
Are such reanalyses so invalid that they should be excluded
under Rule 702? The proffered testimony of Dr. Swan and Dr.
Done supply two examples of plaintiff efforts to reanalyze the
epidemiological evidence and provide a framework for addressing this question.
1. The Testimony of Dr. Swan
The first example involves Dr. Shanna Swan's reanalysis of
the Center for Disease Control epidemiological data published
by Cordero. 71 A fundamental threat to the internal validity of
epidemiological research is recall bias.'7 2 Mothers bearing children with a birth defect may sift through their pre-natal experience in search of an explanation for the injury. As a
consequence, in case-control studies employing a control group
of healthy babies, the case mothers will remember more drug
exposures which produces a biased result. Researchers can try
to alleviate this threat in several ways. One alternative is to
examine the prescription records of the mother's physician. Epidemiologists at the Center for Disease Control employed another
confidence interval of 0.20-4.02. A meta analysis combining all studies generated an Odds Ratio of 1.05, with a Chi Square of .06, p. < .81, and a 95% confidence interval of 0.42-2.62. Id. at 78. Plaintiff experts have criticized these
techniques, in part because they may treat all included studies as if they were
of equal quality. See Testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan, morning session,
Sept. 19, 1991, at 39ff, Havner v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 883915-F (Tex. Dist. Ct., 214th Jud. Dist., March 17, 1994) (on file with the
author).
The limited number of limb defects in the epidemiological literature raises
the issue of whether the relationship between Bendectin use and other types of
defects is relevant to the question of whether Bendectin causes limb reduction
defects. This, of course, is a question of external validity. Bendectin plaintiffs
and defendants have, from time to time, been on both sides of this issue. See
Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 26.
170. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan, morning session, Sept.
19, 1991 at 1-81, Havner v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-3915-F
(Tex. Dist. Ct., 214th Jud. Dist., March 17, 1994) (on file with the author).
171. Cordero et al., supra note 114, at 2307.
172. Recall bias is just one of many potential sources of bias that threaten
the internal validity of epidemiological studies. Other important sources of bias
are: publication bias-only studies that uncover significant results are published; and the existence of confounders that interact with the drug in question
to produce injury. See Green, supra note 57, at 649-51; David L. Sackett, Bias
in Analytic Research, 32 J. CHRONIC DIsEASEs 51, 51 (1979).
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particularly innovative method in analyzing data from the Metropolitan Atlanta Congenital Defects Program. 173 The investigators divided the data into categories of birth defects and then
examined the rate of first-trimester Bendectin exposure for each
defect.' 74 They compared these "cases" to a control group composed of infants with birth defects other than the one being evaluated.' 7 5 Because all children in the study, both cases and
controls, suffered from some birth defect, the study minimized
recall bias.' 7 6 As the authors noted, this technique would not
allow them to detect an effect if a substance under investigation
uniformly increased the risk of all types of defects investigated.' 7 7 The authors discounted this possibility, however, noting that known human and animal teratogens cause specific
78
birth defects or patterns of defects.'
Dr. Swan argued that, if Bendectin causes more than one
kind of birth defect, this technique would underestimate its teratogenic effects because Bendectin exposure would cause some
of the control group defects and the resulting analysis would underestimate the drug's effect.' 7 9 Dr. Swan re-read interview
forms from the study and corrected what she perceived to be coding errors in drug use or date of exposure.' 8 0 Then, in order to
avoid a control group of children with defects potentially caused
by Bendectin exposure, she chose as a control only those children afflicted with Down's Syndrome and other known genetic
disorders.' 8 ' Dr. Swan reasoned that, because researchers
know that drug exposure does not cause these injuries, diagnostic bias would not attenuate the results. 182 Using this new control group, her reanalysis produced a significant correlation
83
between Bendectin and limb reduction defects.'
Measured by a validity standard, Dr. Swan's use of a different control group seems reasonable. It attempted to achieve
some of what the CDC investigators hoped to achieve by using a
control group comprised of children with defects while also controlling for a separate threat to internal validity arising from the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Cordero et al., supra note 114, at 2307-09.
Id. at 2307.
Id.
Id. at 2310.
Id.
Id.
Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"misdiagnosis" of the control group. There is, however, an additional factor to consider. As the First Circuit observed in Lynch
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the Odds Ratio between
Bendectin exposure and Down's Syndrome in the Atlanta sample was 0.57-children suffering from Down's Syndrome were
less likely to have been exposed to Bendectin than children suffering from other defects.1 8 4 Cordero's study prominently reported this result and Dr. Swan must have known this when she
chose to use children with genetic defects as the control group.
A comparison between the Down's Syndrome children and children with most other defects will produce an Odds Ratio substantially in excess of 1.0.185 The First Circuit referred to this
when it dismissed Swan's analysis:
As far as appears from what is in the record, Swan made no allowance
for the possibility that the very fact of having such a severe genetic
deficiency as Down's Syndrome might operate to make other rare deficiencies such as limb reduction less likely to occur in the control group
- that is, that the combination of Down's syndrome and another major
misfortune might be extremely unusual. Without accounting for this
possible skewing of the control
group, Swan's basis for her comparative
186
conclusion is not apparent.

The court provided no authority to support its assertion and the
Cordero Study's data supplies no evidence for this proposition.
The study does not imply that Down's Syndrome is a prophylactic against other types of defects; that conclusion would require
a comparison of Down's Syndrome children and all other children for the existence of an additional defect. Absent some authority that Down's Syndrome has this effect, the court's
assertion is little more than unsubstantiated hypothesis, hardly
the type of validity threat that merited rejecting Dr. Swan's
testimony.
This does not mean that Dr. Swan's analysis is preferable to
that of Cordero and his colleagues. In fact, there are at least
three reasons why their analysis is superior. First, Dr. Swan's
analysis creates a greater likelihood of recall bias. Because the
parents of a Down's Syndrome child know that the defect has
184. Id. at 1195. The study coded approximately 6% (10 of 166) of the
Down's Syndrome children as exposed to Bendectin. In the entire sample, approximately 9.5% (117 of 1,231) of the children were exposed. Cordero et al.,
supra note 114, at 2308, tbl. 2.
185. The Cordero study reported a 1.18 Odds Ratio for limb reductions. Id.
Using only the data reported in the study and, using the Downs Syndrome children as the controls, the Odds Ratio for limb reductions is approximately 2.3
(14*156)/(10*115). See id.
186. Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1195.
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genetic origins, they are less likely to search through their prenatal experience for possible chemical causes of the injury. In
addition, the incidence of morning sickness among mothers carrying children with Down's Syndrome is unknown. If the incidence is lower than other mothers experienced, Down's
Syndrome mothers would presumably be less likely to take any
morning sickness medication which would make Down's Syndrome children an inappropriate control. Finally, the control
group was inappropriate because Dr. Swan knew the result she
would obtain before she conducted her reanalysis. Because Dr.
Swan knew before she began that her comparison would produce
a positive correlation between Bendectin use and limb reduction
defects, the analysis could not test this hypothesis; it could not
produce a negative answer. The possibility of a Type II error
was zero and the possibility of a Type I error was essentially
unknowable. Perhaps this lies at the heart of the First Circuit's
rejection of her analysis. Although it is particularly troublesome
when an investigator preparing an analysis for litigation knows
a priorithat the results will support the client's position, it does
not necessarily follow that a court should exclude such testimony. The problem with Dr. Swan's testimony arose because
she completed the reanalysis for the purposes of litigation; she
was not testing a research hypothesis. To exclude her testimony
on this ground, however, would condemn many, if not most reanalyses of existing data by experts hired for litigation.
2.

The Testimony of Dr. Done

The second example is Dr. Done's proffered testimony in
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.'8 7 When the case
first appeared before him, Judge Brown entered summary judgment for the defendant.' 8 8 He first affirmed a Magistrate's order excluding all in vitro and in vivo studies.' 8 9 He then held
that the plaintiffs expert testimony on epidemiology was inadmissible because it lacked the requisite Rule 703 foundation. 90
187. 131 F.R.D. 71 (D. N.J. 1989), rev'd, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), on remand, 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D. N.J. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
188. Id. at 74.
189. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042,
1045 (D. N.J. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691
(1994). The plaintiff did not challenge this portion of the ruling. Id. at 1045,
1047 n.8.
190. DeLuca, 131 F.R.D. at 74.
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The Third Circuit reversed, first noting that the primary
difference between Dr. Done and the opposing epidemiologists
was that Dr. Done subscribed to tle approach advocated by Professor Kenneth Rothman,' 9 ' which deemphasizes traditional
significance testing in favor of reporting relative risks and confidence intervals surrounding estimates of relative risk.19 2 The
court held that without a record-supported, factual finding that
the data Dr. Done used was not of the type reasonably relied
upon by experts in epidemiology, Rule 703 did not bar his testimony. 193 Because Dr. Done used data from the same published
epidemiological studies the defense relied on, the court ex194
pressed serious doubts that such a finding would be possible
Turning to Rule 702, the court noted that the admissibility of
Dr. Done's analysis was susceptible of judicial notice to the ex195
tent he based it on traditional epidemiological methodology.
Because the existing record was insufficient to make this decision, the court remanded and invited the trial judge to conduct
hearings and obtain expert assistance in determining whether
the evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. 19 6 Finally, the Third Circuit specifically refused to decide whether
epidemiological proof is inadmissible unless the data allow one
to reject the null hypothesis at a .05 level of statistical signifi197 It
cance, leaving the question for the trial court on remand.
did note, however, that the trial court should not focus solely
upon tests of significance but rather should assess "all the risks
198
of error posed by the proffered evidence."
In many respects the Third Circuit's analysis in DeLuca exhibits the best understanding of validity issues of all the
Bendectin opinions. The court's appreciation for the importance
191. See Kenneth Rothman, Modem Epidemiology (1986); Amicus Curiae
Brief for Kenneth Rothman et al. in Support of Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
192. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946-49
(3d. Cir. 1990), on remand, 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D. N.J. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
193. Id. at 953.191 Id.
194. Id. at 954.
195. Id. at 955-56.
196. Id. The defendant had urged this position. Id. at 954. The statistical
significance requirement was, of course, at the heart of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990). Recall, however,
that Brock employed a sufficiency and not an admissibility analysis. See Brock,
874 F.2d at 311-15.
197. Deluca, 911 F.2d at 955.
198. Id. at 959.
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of both Type I and Type II errors, and its recognition of the existence of multiple threats to validity stand in sharp contrast to the
analyses in Lynch and Brock. This very understanding, however, made it difficult for the court to announce any specific admissibility guidelines and it left those issues to the trial
court.

199

Judge Brown proceeded to hold a five day hearing followed
by extensive post-hearing submissions. 20 0 The parties offered
written direct testimony and oral cross examination of eight ex120 seppert witnesses. 2 0 1 Based on this record the judge20made
2
arate findings of fact and 41 conclusions of law.
Judge Brown first contrasted the lack of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin ingestion and limb reduction defects in the published literature with Dr. Done's
conclusion that reanalysis demonstrated a relationship. 20 3 The
parties did not dispute that Dr. Done's underlying data were of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in epidemiology. 20 4 They
did dispute, however, the validity of Dr. Done's calculations and
the manner in which he presented his ultimate results, what
Judge Brown characterized as "the methodology employed by
Dr. Done."20 5 Addressing this methodology, Judge Brown noted
occasions in which Dr. Done included data that he arguably
should have omitted, 20 6 other occasions where he excluded data
that he should have included,2 0 7 and still other occasions where
he selectively reported data.20 8 The judge noted that Dr. Done's
reanalysis did not give greater weight to studies with larger
number of exposed defects, the studies with the greatest
power. 20 9 Dr. Done also failed to weight studies based on their
design or control for other sources of bias. 210 Dr. Done did not
attempt to reach a quantitative conclusion based on his reevalu199. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1044.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1044-59.
202. Id. at 1059.
203. Id. at 1045-46.
204. Id. at 1047 n.10.
205. Id.
206. Id. Judge Brown then proceeded to examine Dr. Done's calculations
and presentation in considerable detail. He compared Dr. Done's calculations of
relative risks with those of the defense experts and Dr. Shanna Swan, the
plaintiffs other expert witness. On several occasions, he noted that Dr. Swan's
analysis contravened Dr. Done's. Id. at 1047-49.
207. Id. at 1050.
208. Id. at 1051.
209. Id. at 1051.
210. Id. at 1051-52.
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ation of the data, either by way of pooled data or a meta analysis.211

Finally, the Judge noted a number of ways in which Dr.

21 2
Done's presentation was misleading.
The judge then proceeded to hold Dr. Done's testimony inad-

missible under both Rules 702 and

703.213

He followed a five

part Rule 702 analysis which considered: the novelty of the
technique; the existence of a specialized literature; the expert's
qualifications; the non-judicial uses to which the scientific techniques are put; and the frequency with which the technique
leads to erroneous results. 2 i 4 With respect to each element,
2 15
Judge Brown found Dr. Done's testimony to be wanting.
Although the judge did not discuss scientific validity in making
his 702 ruling, the opinion can be translated into this language.
Statistical Conclusion validity posed the biggest threat to Dr.
Done's findings. The thrust of his analysis was that, although
individual studies fail to produce a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and limb reduction defects, an analysis of all the data together do reveal a relationship.
Unfortunately, Dr. Done selected his 106 "data sets" in a manner that made it difficult to assess the relative likelihood of Type
I and Type II errors. One gets the sense that Dr. Done engaged
in a fishing expedition, sifting through large number of correlations in search of significant relationships. Moreover, the reanalyses contained measurement errors due to unreliable
coding, incorrect calculations or both.
The judge also held the testimony inadmissible under Rule
703, concluding that experts in the field would not use the data
Dr. Done relied on in rendering an opinion.21 6 Again, the judge
211. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1052.
212. Id. at 1053. "Dr. Done's statement that 70% of his data sets have an
upper confidence level above 2.0 is misleading without the corresponding information that 94% have lower confidence limits below 2.0 and only 30% of his
data sets have a relative risk greater than 2.0." Id. In Dr. Done's analysis, a
"data set" is a reported risk ratio between Bendectin use and a defect. Some
studies appear several times in Dr. Done's analysis because he reports relationships for more than one type of defect. Other studies appear only once. There
were a total of 106 data sets, all apparently given equal weight in constructing
statements such as the one quoted above. Id. at 1052.
Judge Brown also noted that: "Although Dr. Done stated in his report that
'92%' of the studies are compatible with an increase, he did not mention in his
report that the studies were also compatible with a decrease (a proposition
which he readily admits)." Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 1059.
214. Id. at 1056.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1059.
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presented a detailed, particularistic analysis. Epidemiological
studies are, of course, of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Dr. Done's recalculations, however, produced
"new data" that "has not and cannot in many instances be replicated by other experts in the field or even be explained." 21 7 Because Dr. Done's testimony was inadmissible under Rules 702
and 703, the plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proof on
the issue of causality and 21the
court granted the defendant's
8
summary judgment motion.
The testimony Dr. Done proffered in DeLuca presents a particularly difficult case. From a validity point of view it is tempting to agree with the judge's conclusion. At several points the
judge implied that the basic flaw in Done's analyses was that
neither defense nor plaintiff experts were able to replicate a
number of Dr. Done's conclusions. 2 19 This inability to replicate
the data, however, does not present a problem if one can trace
Dr. Done's methods with sufficient specificity to attempt a replication. Under these circumstances Dr. Done's conclusions would
be falsifiable and, in this core sense, scientific. 220 Because a
substantial number of Dr. Done's conclusions were falsifiable,
however, Judge Brown was able to demonstrate how they were
in error. Indeed, it is this detailed demonstration of error that
gives power to the opinion. The court did not question epidemiology as a valid methodology. Rather, the judge challenged Dr.
Done's particular recalculations and the "new data" these suspect recalculations generated. At this level of analysis the court
found Dr. Done's testimony to be flawed largely because it was
not a neutral rendition of the epidemiological evidence concerning Bendectin. The judge depicted Dr. Done as a "party witness"
who designed his analysis to advance his employer's case. Less
apparent, however, is whether Dr. Done's testimony was significantly different from that of experts in other cases and whether
this level of analysis casts doubt on the admissibility of a great
deal of expert testimony.
This question is unlikely to be answered any time soon.
Although the Third Circuit demonstrated particular concern for
the dangers of devising a special rule for Bendectin cases, Judge
Brown did just this on remand. The judge noted that ordinarily
the inclusion and exclusion of certain data is a matter for the
217. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1059.

218. Id.
219. Id. at 1048, 1059.

220. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 68-70.
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battle of the experts but in this case, Dr. Done's plaintiff-leanings, combined with the errors and uncertainties in his calculations, threatened to confuse the jury.22 1 It is hard to imagine
that this consideration would carry as much weight if the scientific evidence is not fully developed and, therefore, the errors in
the expert's analysis are not so obvious. Likewise, the importance the trial court placed on the fact that Dr. Done had not
published his work in a peer review journal was inevitably influenced by the existence of a large body of published research on
Bendectin. The lack of publication would not weigh so heavily if
there were very little published research. 22 2 Most important,
such a detailed analysis of an expert's proferred testimony is unlikely to occur in more than that handful of cases in which the
courts have become particularly concerned with issues of judicial efficiency and jury confusion.
3.

Summary

The rejection of epidemiological evidence in Lynch and
DeLuca again indicates the uncertain nature of admissibility determinations under a Daubert-like analysis. The proffered testimony of both Drs. Done and Swan presented validity problems.
Scientific validity, however, encompasses a complex set of concepts and is always a matter of degree. It is difficult to pinpoint
exactly why the courts found that this testimony was so invalid
as to be inadmissible. Dr. Done's situation is particularly instructive. Even were one to conclude that the trial judge's opinion fairly reflects Dr. Done's proffered testimony, this at best
supports excluding 50%, 60% or perhaps even 80% of his testimony on scientific validity grounds. It does not, however, fairly
support the exclusion of all Dr. Done's testimony. Importantly,
221. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1058.
222. Most debate over the peer review process concerns its ability to monitor
the scientific validity of reported findings. See, e.g., Thomas S. Burack, Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the
Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. REsoURcEs L. 27 (1987). In this regard, the value of peer
review is frequently overrated, as any academic who has been a reviewer can
attest. Less frequently noted is that publication in a reputable peer review
journal imposes a style of discourse that encourages a relatively conservative,
dispassionate, and neutral presentation rarely found in trial testimony. Peer
reviewed, published articles are less likely to overstate or understate the value
of a particular finding or use causal language to describe their results. See Dan
L. Burk, When ScientistsAct Like Lawyers: The Problem ofAdversary Science,
33 JuRImETRcs J. 363, 368 (1993); Robert Rosenthal & Peter David Blanck,
Science and Ethics in Conducting,Analyzing, and Reporting Social Science Research: Implications for Social Scientists, Judges, and Lawyers, 68 IND. L.J.
1209, 1212 (1993).
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neither Lynch nor DeLuca made clear why the problems with
the proffered testimony did not go to weight rather than admissibility. A full understanding of these opinions lies beyond questions of scientific validity and even beyond questions of
admissibility.
V. REASONS FOR RESTRICTIVE ADMISSIBILITY
RULINGS
Why have courts been so willing to make restrictive admissibility rulings in Bendectin cases? In part, the answer can be
found in the objectives courts attempt to achieve by restricting
the scope of admissible scientific testimony and in the special
problems mass torts pose. There are at least two reasons to restrict the admissibility of scientific evidence. First, restricting
this evidence fosters judicial efficiency. If a party's scientific arguments are without merit, excluding them minimizes the expenditure of resources required to resolve the issue and
husbands scarce judicial resources for the resolution of closer
questions. 2 23 A second reason to restrict this testimony is that
juries2 24 will likely be unable to distinguish between reliable
and unreliable evidence. 2 25 Although juries may be good
factfinders with respect to lay testimony, some argue that their
lack of specialized knowledge renders them incapable of assessing the merits of expert testimony. 2 26 Restrictions on admissibility reduce the probability that "a credulous
jury will now and
2 27
again transform scientific dust into gold."
223. See Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 301.
224. On the question of whether the judge or jury is a better factfinder, see
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 217-18 (1989); Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEm 181 (Robert Litan ed., 1993); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box What
EmpiricalResearch Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries,in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert Litan ed., 1993); Sanders, From
Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 82.
225. "The principal argument for reviewing expert testimony is the concern
over jurors' ability to discount unreliable expert testimony appropriately."
Faigman, supra note 52, at 881.
226. See generally HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 13.
227. Id.; see THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE
INTHE COURTS 150 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE EVOLVING
ROLE]. In Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the court cited jury
confusion as one of the reasons for closely reviewing scientific evidence. 959
F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).

1430

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1387

These considerations apply with special force to mass torts,
2 28 of
such as the Bendectin litigation. The many congregations
substance-related mass torts2 29 that have emerged over the last
decade and a half are a new phenomenon of the tort system. The
size and scope of these cases have placed enormous pressures on
the judicial process and judges have reacted by seeking out new,
efficient ways to dispose of them. A first step toward this goal is
procedural rationing. Courts have used class actions under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 0 consolidation
under the Multi-District Litigation Act, 23 1 and consolidation of
cases for trial under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure23 2 in the Bendectin cases and other mass torts. Courts
have likewise engaged in substantive rationing. 2 33 In situations
such as asbestos exposure, the courts, reasonably confident that
228. On the concept of case congregations, see Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 371 (1990); Sanders, The
Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 307.
229. Substance-related mass torts should be distinguished from mass torts
generated by a single event such as an airplane crash.
230. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy,
Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L.
RVv. 467, 490-96 (1985); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort
Case: A ProposedFederal ProcedureAct, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1986).
231. Multi-District Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988). For discussions
of consolidation of multi-district litigation, see DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION: HANDLING CASES BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTrDIsTICTr
LITIGATION (1986); Cornelius J. Moynihan, Jr., Multiple ProductsLiability Suits

and Their Collateral Estoppel Aspects, 73 MAss. L. REV. 83 (1988); Blake M.
Rhodes, The JudicialPanel on MultidistrictLitigation: Time ForRethinking,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1991); Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial
Puzzle in Consolidated and TransferredCases and in Multidistrict Litigation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 622-26 (1987).
232. FED. R. Civ. P. 42. See generallyLinda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: PostaggregativeProcedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 500 (1991).
233. For a thoughtful early discussion of these and other devices designed to
deal with mass torts, see Jack B. Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on the
Law's Reaction to Disasters,11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1986). Courts continue
to explore different means of rationing law in mass tort cases. Recent initiatives include attempts to create mandatory limited fund class actions, (see In re
Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 728 (2d Cir.
1993)), the settlement of claims of future plaintiffs, (see Carlough. v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 710 (3d Cir. 1993); $4.75 Billion Settlement Proposed
for Silicone Breast Implant Cases, Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1 (September 14, 1993) (settlement of all existing and future breast implant cases)) and
the use of the All Writs Act to prohibit some claimants from bringing claims in
state courts (see In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litig., 996 F.2d 1425,
1431 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994)). All these means share
a common feature: they deny individual claimants the right to a separate, individualized trial of their cause of action.
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many plaintiffs have valid claims, have frustrated defendants'
efforts to tie up the legal system by relitigating previously tried
23 5
issues 23 4 or demanding a separate trial for each claimant.
Conversely, in the Bendectin cases, the courts became increasingly certain that plaintiffs did not have valid claims and sought
to prevent separate trials for those individual plaintiffs who had
not litigated their claims in a 1985 consolidated trial in the
Southern District of Ohio.2 3 6 Admissibility rulings provided one
of the few devices available to achieve the goal of non-suiting
these plaintiffs.
Likewise, concern about the jury's ability to understand scientific evidence is particularly salient in mass tort cases. Here,
as in any lawsuit where multiple juries try similar facts, an inability to understand the evidence may produce inconsistent results. In most situations inconsistent verdicts can be explained
in terms of unique facts presented in one case and not another.
In mass tort cases, however, the outcome frequently turns on
questions of general causation and inconsistencies are not easily
hidden. 2 37 Concerns about jury inconsistency echoes through
234. Offensive collateral estoppel has proven to be an unsuccessful device to
achieve the goal of improving efficiency in mass tort cases. Michael D. Green,
The Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to FulfillIt's Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. Rav. 141, 186-87, 207-12
(1984) [hereinafter Green, Offensive Collateral];see Setter v. A.H. Robins Co.,
748 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1984); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681
F.2d 334, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1982). Other tactics have been more successful. In
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that the defendant could not raise a state-of-the-art defense in an asbestos products liability action. 447 A2d 539, 542 (1982). Although the court
quickly retreated from this position in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,it did
not overturn Beshada, but restricted it to "the circumstances giving rise to its
holding." 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (1984). One interpretation of this statement is
that, after a substantial amount of asbestos litigation, the Beshada court engaged in substantive rationing by refusing to allow the defense to use an argument that had failed repeatedly in the past. See In Re Asbestos Litigation, 829
F.2d 1233, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988).
235. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651-52, 662
(E.D. Tex. 1990) (rejecting an individual-by-individual approach to damage
awards in a class action suit); Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts:
Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 90, 103-04 (1989) (discussing the
development of aggregation in mass claims).
236. In Re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litig.,
624 F. Supp. 1212, 1250 (S.D. Ohio, 1985), affd sub nom., In Re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
237. See, e.g., Green, Offensive Collateral, supra note 234, at 215-20 (discussing concerns of inconsistent jury verdicts). Professor Green gives an example ofjury inconsistency in a mass tort case where five separate juries heard the
same evidence on questions common to five asbestos cases tried simultaneously
in the same courtroom against twelve defendants in 1982. Id. at 221-22. In
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the Bendectin cases, including Lynch 238 and Brock.2 39 Inconsistency may, of course, reflect the fact that a trial poses a particularly close fact pattern and that reasonable juries may differ
about the correct outcome. If so, over time jury verdicts should
produce outcomes that reflect the underlying strength of the
parties' case. 240 The verdicts will define the expected value of a
case and, if that value is low enough, past verdicts will deter
future claimants. 24 1 Faced with this type of inconsistency,
courts might wish to facilitate settlements but would not necessarily want to interfere with the trial process.
Inconsistency may reflect a more fundamental problem,
however: that an unacceptable percentage of juries are reaching
"incorrect" verdicts and, therefore, the verdicts as a group do not
reflect the merits of the issue. Some Bendectin opinions evidence a belief that jury verdicts for the plaintiff were erroneous. 2 42 The restrictive admissibility opinions reflect a judicial
response to special interrogatories the juries disagreed about whether some or
all of the products were defectively designed and marketed; whether asbestos
exposure was the sole cause of mesothelioma; whether the defendant, JohnsManville, was grossly negligent; and the date on which the defendant should
have foreseen the dangers associated with work-place asbestos exposure. Id. at
222. As to this latter determination, the jury answers ranged from 1935 to
1965. Id. at 222-23, 228-35.
238. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856, 861-62 (D.Mass. 1986),
affd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
239. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 310 (5th
Cir.) (noting that inconsistent jury verdicts suggest that appellate courts should
resolve such questions), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1064 (1990); see Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d
1349, 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1990), affd, 6 F.3d
778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
240. A question related to verdict consistency is damages consistency. Once
the defendant's liability has been adjudicated or conceded, one intriguing solution to damage inconsistency is to average damage awards from a representative sample of cases chosen for trial and apply this result to untried cases. The
court in Cimino v. Raymark Industries adopted this approach. 751 F. Supp.
649, 664-65 (E.D. Tex. 1990). This solution greatly reduces transaction costs,
produces a better estimate of the plaintiffs' "true" damages than any individual
verdict, and promotes fairness between different plaintiffs. See Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481,
1490-96 (1992); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, JusticeImproved: The
UnrecognizedBenefits of Aggregationand Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts,
44 STAN.L. REV. 815, 815 (1992).
241. See Galanter, supra note 228, at 388-93; Francis McGovern, Toward a
FunctionalApproach for Managing Complex Litigation,53 U. CHi. L. REV. 440,
478-83 (1986).
242. In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., for example, the court
was concerned that inconsistent verdicts would over-deter defendants and thus
hinder the development of new drugs. 874 F.2d 307, 310, modified, 884 F.2d
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belief that, left alone, too many juries will reach an incorrect
outcome. Judges 2 43 and others 2 44 are particularly suspicious of
the jury's ability to arrive at a correct decision in trials involving
the expert presentation of complex technological and scientific
questions, trials that typify much of mass tort litigation. The
outcome of the Bendectin trials do little to alleviate this concern.
Of the twenty jury trials that have reached a verdict on the merits, eight resulted in a plaintiff victory.245 This 40% success rate
2 46
mirrors the overall success rate in product liability cases.
Thus, the one-sided nature of the scientific evidence has not resulted in a perceptible tilt in favor of Bendectin defendants. Restrictive admissibility determinations may be interpreted as a
response to these "incorrect" verdicts. They are, from this point
of view, an ad hoc method of jury control.
The twin objectives of achieving an efficient use of judicial
resources in mass tort cases and assisting the jury in understanding scientific evidence are meritorious goals. Restrictive
admissibility rulings, however, are a flawed means to these
objectives. With respect to the efficiency goal, the courts have
attempted to achieve with admissibility rulings what they
should be achieving with sufficiency rulings. Indeed, several of
the Bendectin opinions employed a sufficiency analysis. The
Brock court had a relatively easy task because it had a full transcript on which to rule. The courts in Lynch and DeLuca did not
enjoy this luxury. Instead, they encountered expert witnesses
prepared to testify that Bendectin more likely than not caused
the plaintiffs injury. If these courts admitted even part of the
proffered testimony, the plaintiff would be able to present a
prima facie case on causation, making summary judgment for
the defendant inappropriate. Therefore, excluding all of the
plaintiffs causation evidence was a necessary prerequisite to
ruling for the defendant as a matter of law. In every Bendectin
opinion that excluded the plaintiffs expert testimony on causation, the court ultimately entered a judgment for the defendant.
166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); see Alan Golanski, Judicial Scrutiny of Expert Testimony in Environmental Tort Litigation, 9 PACE
EN TL. L. REv. 399, 465 (1992).
243. See In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,
1084-85 (3d Cir. 1980) (due process considerations may create a complex case
exception to the right to a jury trial).
244. William V. Luneberg & Mark Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries
and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternativesfor Coping with the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation,67 VA. L. REv. 887 (1981); see Lempert, supra note 224.
245. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 9.
246. Id. at 5 n.16.
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This need to find all of the plaintiffs causation testimony
inadmissible helps to explain the restrictive rulings in the
Bendectin cases. The courts, persuaded that the plaintiffs had
insufficient evidence to prevail on the merits, sought to avoid
still another trial that might result in a verdict for the plaintiff
2 47
and require them to enter a j.n.o.v., as in Richardson,
248
2
49
Brock, and Ealy.
Efficiency considerations, therefore, play
an important role in these rulings.
Using admissibility rulings in this way has several drawbacks. The Bendectin admissibility decisions confuse an already
blurry line between admissibility and sufficiency. 250 Sufficiency
necessarily entails a decision about the entire body of the party's
case. Perhaps in a Frye-world admissibility might be thought to
raise a similar question: whether a significant part of the scientific community believes that the case presents an arguable scientific issue. After Daubert, however, admissibility is best
described as a decision about individual pieces of scientific evidence, a conception ill-suited to the global assessment of the science supporting a party's position.
Moreover, as others have observed, 2 5 1 the Bendectin cases
are unique in a number of ways including the existence of an
unusually rich body of epidemiological data, an extensive legal
record produced by hundreds of cases and thirty trials and, perhaps most fundamentally, a relatively one sided body of scientific evidence. Admissibility criteria created to dispense with
Bendectin cases may present problems in other areas where the
science is neither as well developed nor its weight as one
sided. 2 52 Perhaps this is inevitable when courts bend the rules
of evidence to foster efficiency. If 80% of a party's expert testimony can be excluded, a court will be very reluctant to admit the
last 20% and allow a trial on the merits. The court will find reasons to exclude the remaining 20% which may undermine a so247. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
248. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.),
modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
249. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 950 (1990).
250. See Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is there a Rational Solution to the Problem of Causation?,7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 193-94 (1992).
251. Green, supra note 57, at 677.
252. This risk exists for incautious sufficiency decisions as well. The best
example of this is Brock's requirement that plaintiffs present statistically significant epidemiological evidence of a relationship between Bendectin use and
their injury. Brock, 874 F.2d at 313-15.
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phisticated approach to the question of scientific validity.
Moreover, admissibility decisions that require a hearing and
briefing as extensive as Judge Brown's in DeLuca erode effi253
ciency gains.
Although this Article opposes the use of admissibility rulings to non-suit plaintiffs in order to achieve efficiency goals, it
does recognize that mature congregations, such as the Bendectin
cases, do pose special problems for the courts and society. Special solutions should be developed but they should focus on the
problem at hand: the repeated litigation of the same issue in a
mature congregation of cases. 25 4 Along these lines, Professor
2 55
Berger has suggested several ways to deal with this issue.
VI.

THE JUROR'S PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE
SOLUTIONS

Restrictive admissibility rules are also an inappropriate solution to the problems juries have with complex scientific arguments in mass tort cases. A problem does exist, however. A
mounting body of evidence supports the position that jurors do
have a difficult time understanding and assessing expert scientific testimony. For example, the American Bar Association Section on Litigation commissioned a Special Committee to study
jury comprehension in complex cases. 2 56 The Committee studied four complex cases in the areas of sexual harassment, antitrust, arson-related insurance fraud, and misappropriation of
trade secrets. The scientific evidence was particularly difficult
in the trade secrets case 2 57 and jurors reported that they had
253. Although there may be relatively few efficiency gains in a particular
case, especially where DeLuca-like hearings are required, the restrictive admissibility rulings may have a chilling effect across the entire congregation of cases
and cause plaintiffs to postpone or forego litigation that enjoys a slim chance of
success.
254. One possibility would be to define certain bodies of knowledge as "social
framework" information and allow the court to instruct the jury on this framework as the court instructs the jury on the "legal framework," it should use in
deciding the case. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:
A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987).
255. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the

Daubert Text, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994).

256. SPECIAL COM ITrEE ON JURY COMPREHENSION, JURY COMPREHENSION
IN COMPLEX CASES i-ii (1989) [hereinafter JuRY COMPREHENSION]. The Committee engaged Elizabeth Loftus, Jane Goodman and Edith Green to conduct the
study. Id.
257. This judgment is based on Richard 0. Lempert's article, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years. See Lempert, supra note

224. Lempert examined thirteen complex cases and rated each on a three point
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trouble understanding the facts. The authors of the report concluded the following:
[Alithough one plaintiffs' attorney suggested that jurors would not
need to understand the chemical processes in dispute to decide this
case, it seems apparent that some ability to comprehend and evaluate
the technical information was in fact, imperative.
It is not clear that jurors-even those employed as engineers who
had completed college courses in chemistry-had that ability. Even
these jurors felt overwhelmed by the technical nature of the evidence.
Less educated
jurors suggested that they were completely "out of their
25 8
league."

The jury also had difficulty applying the facts to the jury instructions to determine whether the facts established the
2 59
claims.
The fact that 40% of the juries that reached the merits of
the Bendectin cases found for the plaintiff is not inconsistent
with the jury's experience in the trade secret case. Interviews
with jurors in one Bendectin trial indicated that they also had
difficulty understanding the scientific evidence. 2 60 A detailed
analysis of six Bendectin trial transcripts indicated some of the
reasons jurors have difficulty with the scientific evidence. Most
importantly, the trial structure itself makes it very difficult to
weigh evidence and, at least within the tort context, to separate
the scientific analysis of causation from other elements of the
tort.2 6 1 Many factors contribute to produce this result.2 62 The
parties typically employ experts whose objectivity is therefore
suspect. Although both plaintiff and defense experts may testify
concerning exactly the same scientific studies and findings, the
structure of trials separates their testimony, sometimes by
many days. Frequently, a roughly equal number of experts from
each side testify on each scientific issue, producing a perception
that real conflict exists within the scientific community on
nearly all questions.2 6 3 Because the parties focus on the science
that they believe best supports their position, the jury is likely to
difficulty scale: low, moderate, and high. Id. at 185-90. The trade secret case
and two others were scored high. Id. at 185-90, tbl. 6.1.
258. JURY COMPREHENSION,supra note 256, at 103.
259. Id. at 54. Jurors in other complex cases have similar problems when
the science is difficult to understand. See Sanders, Jury Deliberation,supra
note 101, at 49-51.
260. Id. at 45.
261. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 61.
262. For a valuable discussion of the shortcomings of present methods of
introducing expert testimony, see Samuel Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 1113 (1991).
263. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 40.
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conclude that all types of scientific
evidence are equally proba264
tive to the issue in dispute.
Ironically, the problem courts have attempted to correct
through restrictive admissibility rulings is, in part, a product of
the Rules of Evidence themselves. For example, under Rule 703
experts may base their opinion on facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions on a subject. Any published articles the expert relied
on would ordinarily be hearsay unless admitted under some exception such as the Learned Treatises exception. Even when admitted under this exception, however, "the statements may be
read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits." 26 5 As a
consequence, the jury does not have the ability independently to
examine and assess statements those works contain. Rather, it
must view them through the filter of party advocacy, a fiter that
makes it very difficult to assess the weight of scientific opinion
on an issue.
All of these difficulties reflect a more general problem with
the presentation of scientific evidence. Much of what goes on at
trial in America is a process of deconstructing science. As Peter
Schuck has noted, law and science are in some ways competing
cultures, each with its own set of central values, incentives,
techniques, biases and orientations. 2 66 Although science and
law share a wide range of cultural values, differences do exist.
The core values of these two cultures reflect these differences.
Whereas science's central value is truth, law's central value, at
least in its judicial manifestation, is justice.2 6 7 Law does not
pursue justice as an abstract ideal, however, but in a context
that acknowledges the existence of competing views of what constitutes a just outcome and allows these competing views to contend for supremacy within an adversarial trial. The differences
between the two cultures create tensions and contests for domi-

264. For example, several jurors interviewed from the Havner Bendectin
trial perceived the epidemiological evidence to be no more probative than
animal studies or in vitro studies on the question of whether the drug is a teratogen. Sanders, Jury Deliberation,supra note 101, at 62.
265. FED. R. EviD. 803(18).
266. Peter Schuck, Multi-CulturalismRedux: Science, Law and Politics, 11
YALE L. & Pot'Y REv. 1 (1993) (discussing the differing cultures of science, law
and politics).
267. Id. at 21; see Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JuRmmTRcs J. 345, 354 (1992) (making the same
distinction).
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nance. 268 In the courtroom, the battle frequently involves attacking the scientific culture itself by focusing on its biases, its
implicit assumptions, and the many ways it inevitably fails to
live up to its own ideals of rigorous methodology and
269
objectivity.
As Sheila Jasanoff has noted, scientific discoveries, like
other types of knowledge, are premised on underlying assumptions and conventions that remain in the background until controversy erupts.270 The assumptions include both experimental
and interpretative conventions. In ordinary scientific conversations these assumptions lie in the background and scientists
speak of things as being true or false. Because scientific knowledge, like other forms of knowledge, is constructed by a community of individuals, it can be deconstructed, pulled apart by
questioning each assumption, each shared understanding, and
each indeterminacy that inevitably infects even the most artfully crafted research. Indeed, many of the admissibility battles
discussed in this Article reflect exactly this type of deconstruction and it is important to note that both plaintiffs and defendants, motivated by a lawsuit, actively participate in this process.
The adversarial trial is particularly well suited to such an effort,
which, in this context, is its greatest weakness:
Adversarial process is indeed a wonderful instrument for deconstructing "facts," for exposing contingencies and hidden assumptions that
underlie scientific claims, and thereby preventing an uncritical acceptance of alleged truths. The adversary process is much less effective,
however, in reconstructing the communally held beliefs that reasonably pass for truth in science. Cross-examination, in particular, unduly privileges skepticism over consensus. It skews the picture of
science that is presented to the legal factfinder and created an impression of 2conflict
even where little or no disagreement exists in
71
practice.

From this perspective the problem confronting the courts involves more than simply assessing the validity of a particular
fact, method, or conclusion. Rather, the court must find a balance between the pursuit of justice in an environment of adver268. [E]xpert testimony can be perceived to be a challenge to certain
fundamental concepts implicit in the structure of trials in the common
law tradition, which calls into question whether the common law mode
of trial prevalent in the United States can accommodate expert testimony without substantial change.
Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131, 1131 (1993).
269. Schuck, supra note 266, at 18.
270. Jasanoff, supra note 267, at 347-48.
271. Id. at 353-54.
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sarial legalism and respect for science's culture, values and
assumptions.
If the heart of the problem confronting juries is that the law
so successfully deconstructs scientific findings that juries find it
very difficult to assess the relative merits of any position and
ultimately begin to discount the value of scientific "truth" for the
resolution of the problem posed to them, 2 72 restricting the evidence they hear is a problematic cure. This cure runs the inevitable risk of balancing the excessively skeptical environment
that ordinary methods create with an uncritical determination
that there is good science and bad science, that the two can be
distinguished, that the trial judge can capably make this distinction, and that the court can protect the jury by the excluding the
bad.
Undoubtedly, admissibility decisions have a role to play in
excluding marginal "science" from the courtroom.2 73 There are,
however, superior alternatives available in most situations.
These alternatives directly confront the problems that arise
from the undervaluation of "normal" scientific understandings
when litigants introduce science through traditional adversarial
processes. 2 74 They include the use of court-appointed experts
and expert panels, the bifurcation of trials in order to try causal
questions separate from breach of duty questions, and the poten272. The Special Committee of the ABA Section of Litigation concluded that
jurors are not too impressed with experts and dismiss many of them as hired
guns. JURY COMPREHENSION, supra note 256, at 40. Other research reflects
similar attitudes. See Neil Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of StatisticalEvidence,
A Social Science Perspective, in THE EVOLVING ROLE, supra note 227, at 296-97.
The perception that experts overwhelm jurors simply because they are experts
is unfounded. As a juror in an asbestos case reported: "The expert testimony
was not a real factor in our decision, except in the very backhanded sense that
it lent medical credence to any result." Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses
Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65, 68.
273. Jasanoff has noted that much, if not all, of what passes for clinical ecology may be excluded because it violates basic canons of science. Jasanoff, supra
note 267, at 355.
274. Of course, the term "normal" is itself difficult to describe. At its core,
however, may reside the idea of an "empiricist repertoire," the conversations
scientists hold when they are not attacking each other's accounts of reality.
Jasanoff, supra note 267, at 348. See generally G. NIGEL GILBERT & MICHAEL J.
MULKAY, OPENING PANDoRA's Box: A SOCOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ScrEsIs'S
DISCOURSE (1984). "Normal" science may occasionally cease to exist in an area
where science itself becomes so politicized that the scientific community divides
into camps that constantly attack the other side's account of reality. Revealingly, this sometimes occurs when the law "captures" an area of science and
uses it to resolve very controversial disputes. See ELEANOR P. WOLF, TRIAL AND
ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE 335 n.34 (1981).
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tial use of specialized science courts and blue ribbon juries. 27 5
Each of these alternatives would either reduce the perception
that science is mostly conflict with little consensus or reduce the
degree to which the central scientific value of truth is pitted
27 6
against the core legal value of justice.
CONCLUSION
Mass torts continue their relentless assault on our common
law tort system. They have forced us to rethink accepted methods of proving causation, the appropriate measure of damages
and even the system's fundamental commitment to an individualized trial of each plaintiffs case. 2 77 Many mass torts create a
pair of problems for the court system. They consume judicial resources and pose complex scientific questions that frequently
confuse juries. The increased use of expert scientific witnesses
that has accompanied the rise of mass torts has prompted
charges that many of these witnesses are introducing "junk science." The Supreme Court crafted its decision in Daubert
against this background. From a narrow perspective, Daubert
simply resolved a longstanding issue in the law of evidence by
holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.
From a wider perspective, the opinion represents an attempt to
define, or perhaps redefine, the relationship between science
and the law.
The American legal system, both in its judicial and regulatory capacities, has constructed a set of structures that facilitate
attacks on science and undermine trust in the judgment of the
scientific community. 278 In one sense Daubert attempted to
redefine this relationship. By placing the concept of scientific
275. See Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 67-82.
276. Specifically, the bifurcation of trials serves this end. It minimizes the
parties' ability to construct presentations that invite the factfinder to trade a
weak case of causation off against a stronger case of negligence. Sanders, From
Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 52. Some oppose bifurcation because it
promotes "truth"over "justice." See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d
207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Roger Trangsrud,
Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 80-82

(1989).
277. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD.L. REV. 951 (1993); Robinson &

Abraham, supra note 240, at 1481-83.
278.

See Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a PluralisticSociety, in Ac-

SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 29 (Deborah
G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) (comparing British and American
CEPTABLE EVIDENCE:

regulatory approaches to risk).
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validity at the center of admissibility decisions, Daubertinvoked
scientific understandings of what constitutes good and bad science. The Court recognized that for science to be useful the law
must attend to more than the scientist's conclusion. The legal
system must, to some degree, be attentive to the scientific
method itself. It must interpret scientific conclusions in the context of the methods and culture which precipitated them.
This very change, however, reveals the degree to which
many restrictive rulings in the Bendectin cases cannot be justified from the perspective of scientific validity. These opinions
are better explained in terms of two other goals: achieving the
efficient resolution of mass torts and responding to the perceived
inability of juries to understand and apply complex scientific
analyses. The Ninth Circuit's Daubert opinion is an example of
this response. It is not surprising that the judiciary has reached
for whatever tools are readily at hand in an attempt to deal with
these problems. This Article has argued that restrictive admissibility rulings are not the best way to achieve these objectives.
Restrictive admissibility rulings do resolve the problems created
by the repeated litigation of the same factual question. They do
so, however, at the cost of confusing the issues of sufficiency and
admissibility and of casting a shadow of uncertainty over
whether similar rules may be applied in other circumstances.
To the degree courts do require more efficient ways of resolving
individual cases in mature mass torts, they should develop sufficiency rules specific to this need.
The problem of jury comprehension of complex scientific arguments presents a more complex issue. Sometimes parties do
attempt to introduce testimony so lacking in validity that exclusion is appropriate because the testimony threatens to cloud the
issue and confuse the jury. Even with respect to Bendectin litigation, however, an area that some have pointed to as an example of "junk science," 27 9 it is difficult to justify the exclusion of
the plaintiffs entire case on scientific validity grounds. More
importantly, marginal science is not the primary source of jury
difficulties with complex scientific arguments. The heart of that
problem lies not in the arguments of expert witnesses but rather
in the structures and processes of adversarial adjudication that
systematically disadvantage the cultural values of science. It is
there that we should seek a remedy.
279. HUBER, GALILEo's REVENGE, supra note 13, ch. 7. But see Kenneth J.
Chesebro, Galileo'sRetort: PeterHuber's Junk Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. REV.
1637 (1993) (criticizing Huber's conclusions).

